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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to bring the specific insights of conflict of laws to issues
challenging contemporary legal theory in its efforts to integrate the changes
wrought by globalisation in the normative landscape beyond the nation-state.
Indeed, conflicting norms and social systems are now at the centre-stage of
jurisprudence. Conversely however, private international legal thinking can
benefit from attention to the other legal disciplines that have preceded it in
‘going global’. It needs to undergo a conceptual overhauling in order to
capture law’s novel foundations and features and adjust its epistemological
and methodological tools to its transformed environment. It must reconsider
the debate about legitimacy of political authority and the values that
constitute its normative horizon. From this perspective, societal
constitutionalism, as mooted by Teubner, provides a particularly promising
avenue for unbounding the conflict of laws, which might then emerge as a
form of de-centred, reflexive coordination of global legal interactions.
KEYWORDS Legal pluralism; conflict of laws; private international law; revival; globalisation; rights;
legitimacy; conflicting rationalities
I. Introduction
In a world society with neither apex nor centre, there is just one way remaining to
handle inter-constitutional conflicts – a strictly heterarchical conflict resolution.
This is not just because of the absence of centralized power, which could be coun-
tered by intensified political efforts, but is rather connectedwith deep structures in
society which Max Weber called the ‘polytheism’ of modernity. Even committed
proponents of the ‘unity of the constitution’ are forced to agree that the unity of
the nation-state constitution is nowmoving toward a ‘clash of civil constitutions’,
toward mutually conflicting rationalities to be defused by a new conflict of laws.1
Teubner’s striking statement elevates the conflict of laws to a meta-
constitutional level. This paper seizes upon this opportunity to ask whether
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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the discipline has specific insights to bring some of the most significant
issues that challenge contemporary legal theory,2 in its attempts to integrate
the radical changes wrought by globalisation in the normative landscape
beyond the nation-state.3 A global legal paradigm,4 that is, a legal conscious-
ness5 comprising modes of reasoning and a conceptual structure adapted to
the new normative landscape, requires an overhauling of the concepts with
which to understand law’s foundations and features. It also mandates a
reconsideration of the values that constitute its normative horizon; calls
for an adjustment of methodological and epistemological tools with which
to understand social complexity; justifies a renewal of the terms of the
debate about legitimacy of political authority. Such an enterprise also
reinforces the conviction that, conversely, private international legal think-
ing has all to gain from attention to the various other legal disciplines that
have preceded it in the effort to ‘go global’. From this double perspective, its
ambition is to further the efforts already undertaken by various (and some-
times conflicting) strands of legal pluralism, as an alternative form of
‘lateral-coordinate approaches’6 towards the crafting of a ‘jurisprudence
across borders’.7
2 Seeing international law (public and private) as a privileged standpoint from which to view legal theor-
etical issues is not new. See, for example, of each: H Batiffol, Aspects philosophiques du droit international
privé (Librairie Dalloz, 1956); R Quadri, ‘Le fondement du caractère obligatoire du droit international
public’ (1952) 80 RCADI 579. But has the modern international lawyer ‘rejected theory’ as Martti Kosken-
niemi surmises? See Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal
Argument (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn 2006) 187. Today, the Transnational Legal Theory
journal publishes conflicts of laws contributions to legal theory (see Martin Herberg, ‘Global Governance
and Conflict of Laws from a Foucauldian Perspective: The Power/Knowledge Nexus Revisited’ (2011) 2(2)
Transnational Legal Theory 243; Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Private International Law Beyond the Schism’ (2011)
2(3) Transnational Legal Theory 347). Comp. my attempt in ‘La globalisation et le droit international privé’
in V Heuzé, R Libchaber and P de Vareilles-Sommières (eds)Mélanges en l’honneur de Pierre Mayer (LGDJ,
2015). For a vision of pluralism through the lens of private international law, see Didier Boden, ‘Le plur-
alisme juridique en droit international privé’ (2005) 49 Archives de Philosophie du Droit 275.
3 Globalisation is understood here as the specific compression of time and space which coincides with late
modernity (Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Polity Press, 1991) 64; the coming of risk
society (Ulrich Beck, La société du risque: sur la voie d’une autre modernité (L Bernardi tr, Flammarion,
2008), global neo-liberal economics (of which it will be question below); the paradoxical ‘return of
science’ (Philip Pomper and David Gary Shaw (eds), The Return of Science: Evolution, History, and
Theory (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002)) in a period of increasing disbelief in the values of modernity;
and, with particular relevance to international law (public and private), the ‘liquidification’ of sover-
eignty: Zygmunt Bauman, Identité (L’Herne, 2010).
4 Ralf Michaels, ‘Globalisation and Law: Law Beyond the State’ in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Law
and Social Theory (Hart Publishing, 2nd edn 2013) 287–304; Benoît Frydman, ‘Comment penser le droit
global?’ (2012) Centre Perelman de Philosophie du Droit Working Paper n°2012/01, online: <www.
philodroit.be/IMG/pdf/comment_penser_le_droit_global_2011.pdf?lang=en>.
5 Duncan Kennedy observes that what has been globalised (in successive waves, see (n 3)) are modes of
legal consciousness (see Duncan Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000’
in David Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) 19–73.
6 Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 106.
7 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (Cambridge University
Press, 2012).
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A. Pluralism is in; conflicts are out
Indisputably, globalisation, or its contemporary (fourth?8) avatar, is
inflicting an identity crisis upon the conflict of laws.9 One of the reasons
for this is that it illustrates the link between legal methods elaborated in
view of dealing with conflicting norms and the framing of law’s origins,
functions and objects within a particular legal paradigm. In other words,
modes of legal reasoning in the face of conflicting norms and claims to
authority reflect various conceptions and expectations as to what law is
and does, where it comes from and the types of issues it deals with.
Change affecting these assumptions and representations about the world
affects established forms of legal knowledge; probing them is a distinctly
‘dangerous method’.10
Traditionally – that is, in the course of the last century and under the
influence of classical legal thought in international law11 – the ordering
of competing normative claims outside any particular domestic system
was sought in (public or private) international law. It was understood
both to provide an overall scheme of intelligibility through which to under-
stand other social spheres and to make available operational tools with
which to define authority, allocate responsibilities, and guide the
conduct of public and private actors. However, the emergence of compet-
ing, diffuse (post-Westphalian) forms of authority challenges the law in
these ordering functions.12 In the wake of displacements of power from
8 Contemporary globalisation is not the ‘first’ phenomenon of its kind in the history of intellectual thought:
see Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, ‘Approaches to Global Intellectual History’ in Samuel Moyn and
Andrew Sartori (eds), Global Intellectual History (Columbia University Press, 2013) 3–32, 5; for previous
globalisations affecting the law, see Kennedy (n 5).
9 Understood as a crisis of modernity, it extends to the institution of law in general. However, at the
same time, law, particularly international (public and private) law is far from irrelevant or absent
from the global scene. On the one hand, the processes which drive the global economy, from com-
modity and financial markets to global supply chains, are all either embedded in domestic legal
orders or public international economic law. This explains why novel claims (which will be ques-
tioned below) to private transnational authority are all made in specifically legal terms, even if
they occur outside the bounds of any supporting institutional system. The contestation of
global inequalities and injustices, whether in the form of human rights violations, environmental
concerns, gender inequity or precarity in the workplace, all use legal syntax. Beyond judicial or
quasi-judicial fora (national and international, public or private), the emancipatory potential of
the language of the law is used in institutions (such as ILO, OECD) and by activists, in the name
of civil society, so that law appears as crucial within the many political projects undertaken with
a view to reconstruct a fairer global society. Human rights as the ‘last utopia’ will be further dis-
cussed below towards the end of section II, B (‘Impersonal rights’).: Samuel Moyn, The Last
Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, 2010).
10 ‘Dangerous method’ is the topic of the current PILAGG (Private International Law as Global Governance)
research project: PILAGG, online: <http://blogs.sciences-po.fr/pilagg>.
11 ‘Classical legal thought’ is a paradigm identified in (US) domestic law: see Duncan Kennedy, The Rise and
Fall of Classical Legal Thought (Beard Books, 1975); but its influence stretched across the board (covering
all Western systems and into international law).
12 See Roger Cotterrell and Maksymilian del Mar (eds), Authority in Transnational Legal Theory (Edward
Elgar, forthcoming).
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public to non-state actors,13 struggles for legitimacy occur between state-
bound or endorsed legal systems and other unidentified sources. More-
over, sovereignty, the foundational concept of the international and dom-
estic legal order, appears inverted or subverted, investing in private actors,
or indeed signifying obligations towards the international community
rather than supremacy.14 It is difficult to understand what ‘law’ signifies
in this environment, since its existing structure and syntax assume,
implicitly, a horizon confined to the nation-state (either within the
nation-state, or the interactions between nation-states). From a theoretical
perspective, therefore, a new conceptual scheme is required in order to
seriously consider whether to legitimise, challenge, or govern new,
diffuse and disorderly expressions of power and normativity – those of
the ‘unauthorised’ actors of late modernity15 – which do not necessarily
fit traditional forms of legal knowledge. However, the crisis that affects
the conflict of laws seems to be more acute than the minor earthquakes suf-
fered by neighbouring legal disciplines. Public international law has
adapted to the massive arrival of non-state right-holders by transforming
itself into an overarching welfarist system and exploring its own relation-
ship to global justice.16 Comparative law has left behind its static classifi-
cations of family traditions to join forces with the anthropology of legal
transfers17 or contribute to the aesthetics of global spaces.18 Moreover,
while analytical jurisprudence arguably loses its relevance outside the
legal order of the nation-state, various schools of legal pluralism have
undertaken to ‘disborder’ jurisprudence19 so as to grapple with the possible
foundations of legal authority beyond state boundaries.20 Global,
13 Ibid. For an exhaustive study of multinational corporations as regulators, see Anna Beckers, Enforcing
Corporate Social Responsibility Codes: On Global Self-regulation and National Private Law (Hart Publish-
ing, 2015). See more generally on the rise of non-state actors, indicators and rankings as emblematic of
global law, Kevin Davis, Angelina Fischer, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry (eds), Governance
by Indicators: Global Power Through Classification and Rankings (Oxford University Press, 2012); Benoît
Frydman and Arnaud Van Waeyenberge (eds), Gouverner par les standards et les indicateurs: De Hume
aux rankings (Bruylant, 2014).
14 On the inversion of sovereignty, see Jens Bartelson, Sovereignty as Symbolic Form: Critical Issues in Global
Politics (Routledge, 2014); and Part III, B of this paper.
15 Beck (n 3).
16 Emmanuelle Jouannet and Christopher Sutcliffe (trs), The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014). Moreover public international law, on the tide
of managerialism and fragmentation, is now increasingly confronted with conflicts articulated as col-
lisions of jurisdiction and applicable law, among which private or hybrid authorities and regimes
now occupy a significant place. It is progressively taking on the traditional problematics of private inter-
national law (see Muir Watt (n 2)).
17 Günter Frankenberg (ed), Order from Transfer: Comparative Constitutional Design and Legal Culture
(Edward Elgar, 2013).
18 Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Geopolitica del diritto: Genesi, governo e dissoluzione dei corpi politici (Editori
Laterza, 2013).
19 Berman (n 7).
20 See Cotterell and del Mar (n 12) with various pluralist contributions from Paul Berman, Nico Krisch,
Nicole Roughan. The debate focuses on the very nature of law (if it has one), the foundations of
law’s legitimacy (mythological or otherwise), and the relationship between legal and political authority.
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cosmopolitan or societal constitutionalism21 and more improbably, global
administrative law,22 are the result of a similar turn involving a radical
overhaul of central disciplinary assumptions. Thus, the complex normative
conflicts of our global age have arguably become an exciting new theoretical
and empirical discipline, drawing on an array of highly diverse ideas from
which private international law (time-worn and bounded) is paradoxically
excluded.
This new legal theoretical literature is now self-consciously global; it is also,
in its most plausible avatars,23 largely pluralist. As Paul Berman points out:
It has now been approximately 20 years since scholars first began pushing
the insights of legal pluralism into the transnational and international
arena. During those two decades, a rich body of work has established plur-
alism as a useful descriptive and normative framework for understanding a
world of relative overlapping authorities, both state and non-state. Indeed,
there has been a veritable explosion of scholarly work on legal pluralism,
soft law, global constitutionalism, the relationships among relative auth-
orities, and the fragmentation and reinforcement of territorial
boundaries.24
Competing plural and transnational assertions of authority are singled
out as the emblematic feature of our complex world, while the defining
problem in contemporary legal thought lies in the interactions of legal
traditions, social spheres, cultural values, rights and identities, epistem-
ologies or world-visions. Rather than a search for consensus (around sub-
stantive constitutional values) or the promotion of new utopias (the quest
for global justice), pluralism variously celebrates diversity as competition
(law and economics), devises methodologies designed to mediate or coor-
dinate (systems theory), and renews definitions of authority and legiti-
macy (socio-legal studies). Although pluralism comes in many guises
and its very tenets are contested,25 the features which set it apart from
other modes of dealing with diversity (liberalism, or, in international
law, monism) are, arguably, the location of authority within each of the
conflicting systems,26 the acceptation of compromise, hybridity or
21 Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutionalism and the Cosmopolitan State’ (2013) 20(2) Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies 605; for ‘societal constitutionalism’ inspired from Luhmann’s systems theory, Teubner
(n 1), discussed in detail below.
22 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’
(2005) 68(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 15.
23 These do not include forms of global constitutionalism or global governance which see the world as
subject to one overarching legal order, either on the basis of an expanded version of public inter-
national law, or by projection of democratic institutions familiar to (some models of) the nation-state.
24 Paul Schiff Berman, ‘The Evolution of Global Legal Pluralism’ Cotterrell and del Mar (n 12) forthcoming;
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (Cambridge University
Press, 2012).
25 Brian Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local To Global’ (2007) 30 Sydney Law
Review 375.
26 Boden (n 2).
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‘constructive distortion’27 as an end result,28 and reflexivity as an intel-
lectual style.29
At first sight, the conflict of laws would appear to fit quite well among these
pluralist strands of thought. Indeed, in his impressive panorama or theories of
global law, Neil Walker classifies together, as models of a ‘lateral-coordinate
approach’, both the conflict of laws and legal pluralism.30 Fromwithin the dis-
cipline of the conflict of laws, this is hardly surprising. The links between plur-
alism and conflicts31 are surely ancient: an influential definition of private
international law sees its function as management of horizontal pluralism,32
while the work Santi Romano has become a reference for so-called ‘unilater-
alist’ doctrines.33 Of these two related disciplines, however, the latter – with its
contemporary constitutional overtones, its comparativist pedigree and its
connection to transnational societal concerns – is in. Conflict of laws –
long a thriving intellectual field34 – is out. Why then has its status so declined
as to be reduced ‘parochial boundary-maintenance’,35 while the various
brands of legal pluralism flourish? As a descriptive enterprise, ‘global legal
pluralism is now recognised as an entrenched reality of the international
and transnational legal order’.36 Normatively, or as a theoretical project, it
is perhaps the most promising avenue with which to approach contemporary
jurisprudential questions dissociated from the domestic legal order.
One explanation might be that the conflict of laws has lost out within in its
own orbit. This is not to deny that there is a flourishing industry of traditional
private international rule-craft around the world; indeed, codification seems
never been to have been so popular.37 But this does not help dispel the
impression that the jurisprudential vein is elsewhere. There may no longer
be any reason, possibly other than the strength of the professional lobby,38
to support the survival of the conflict of laws at all costs. At most, it might
27 Gunter Teubner, ‘Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (1991–1992) 13 Cardozo Law Reviev 1443.
28 The compatibility of hybridity and pluralism is contested, however, by Alexis Galán and Dennis Patter-
son, ‘The Limits of Normative Legal Pluralism: Review of Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A
Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders’ (2013) 11(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 783.
29 See the fascinating contribution by Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels and Annelise Riles, ‘From Multiculturalism
to Technique: Feminism, Culture and the Conflict of Laws Style’ (2012) 64(3) Stanford Law Review 589,
suggesting that the conflict of laws could provide an ‘intellectual style’ for dealing with conflicts of cul-
tural norms; (eds), Transdisciplinary Conflict of Laws (2008) 71(3) Law and Contemporary Problems.
30 Ibid.
31 On which, see the remarkable ‘dypthic’ presented by Didier Boden (n 3), which relates the tenets of
pluralism with those of monism, and then translates them into the terms used by the conflict of laws.
32 Ph Francescakis, La théorie du Renvoi et les conflits de systèmes en droit international privé (Sirey, 1958).
33 Santi Romano, L François and P Gothot (trs), L’ordre juridique (Dalloz, 2nd edn 2002).
34 Ralf Michaels, ‘After the Revolution – Decline and Return of US Conflicts of Laws’ (2009) 11 Yearbook of
Private International Law 11.
35 Walker (n 6) 109.
36 Berman (n 24) forthcoming.
37 See the panorama of codification in Symeon Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law Around the World: An
International Comparative Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2014).
38 Anthony Ogus, ‘The Economic Basis of Legal Culture: Networks and Monopolization’ (2002) 22(3) Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 419.
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be argued, it is now a sub-department of internationalised contract law, a
technical adjunct for intra-European Union (EU) market issues, an auxiliary
to international commercial arbitration or a largely strategic tool for cross-
border forum-shoppers. Legal issues arising in connection with cross-
border collisions of rights and norms seem to fall within the remit of other,
more recent, more overbearing or more political principles such as federalism
(or free movement in the EU) and human rights, which both sweep away
private international techniques and methods into the great sea of proportion-
ality.39 Moreover, much high-profile cross-border economic litigation is com-
posed of questions of domestic contract law under party autonomy. In other
fields, notably of personal status and family relationships, either the idea of
recognition40 suffices or conflict rules break down under the pressure of
public policy. Perhaps then the sleeping discipline (dog or beauty?) should
be left to lie as a vestige of the pre-global age.
A further consideration is that it has missed the very turning which it was emi-
nently well placed to take,41 and which might have invested it both as queen of
the great new issues of jurisprudence in a world of colliding norms and as pro-
vider of the methodological toolbox which compose the new legal paradigm
beyond state borders.42 It might have inspired an authoritative perspective,
born of a multi-secular experience, which to approach unfamiliar expressions
of sovereignty or novel assertions of jurisdiction. It might thereby have provided
a better understanding of our pluralistic world in which competing non-state
norms must find their place among more venerable law-like forms. It might
have led the critical stance on informal empire,43 peopled by multinational cor-
porate actors, contractual cross-border value chains and markets without
borders, which are the very stuff of private (international) law. The problem,
then, is arguably deeper than mere irrelevance. Its shortcomings, or worse, its
darker sides for which it has already come under fire for their role in the
modern imperial enterprise, may be the very cause of the great imbroglio
beyond the state in which the law itself is losing out in favour of alternative
more credible world-visions.
B. Conflicts are back…well, sort of
On each of these points, alternative disciplinary vocabularies have arrived on
the scene and displaced the conflict of laws with more exciting ‘intimations’44
39 This is not to suggest, however, that proportionality itself has a uniform content in these contexts: see
Antonio Marzal Yetano, La Dynamique du Principe de Proportionnalité. Essai dans le contexte des libertés
de circulation du droit de l’Union européenne (Institut Universitaire Varenne, 2014).
40 Muir Watt (n 2) 22.
41 This point has been developed more extensively: ibid.
42 Michaels (n 4).
43 See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution’ (2011) 61 Uni-
versity of Toronto Law Journal 1.
44 Walker (n 6).
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as to contemporary ‘changes of state’.45 Without theoretical renewal, the con-
flict of laws no longer delivers on a world-vision with which to make sense of
global chaos – a point on which the promise of legal pluralism is far more
ambitious, to the extent that it takes on board all sorts of normative diversity
visible outside or beyond the state. Whatever the reasons that have led to its
current eclipse, however justified its dismissal by current research, and not-
withstanding the wealth of its history and potential, the discipline is probably
not, or no longer, asking the right questions, proposing the appropriate
methods or using an adequate epistemology. Yet, paradoxically, at the very
moment where it might seem to be displaced by competing vocabularies, a
closer look shows it (on the contrary) to be invested with a new relevance.
Pluralist thinking has ‘caught on’ to conflicts. In many respects, the insights
of the new global thinking have overtones of the reinvention of the wheel –
if in a richer, interdisciplinary mode.
Global constitutionalism is framed as providing for the modes of inter-
action between overlapping normative systems. Political science calls for
interface norms.46 The central problem singled out by contemporary legal
pluralism is framed in terms of competing norms and claims to authority,
while proposed solutions for their mutual accommodation take the form of
deference, coordination or synthesis, and competition. The diversity thus
described, the terms defined, the methods used, the values involved, are all
largely familiar to the history of the conflict of laws, in one era or another.
The discipline grew out of the concurrence of different claims to authority
(religious and secular; political independence); had to confront heterogeneous
traditions of law-making (written and oral customs; formal and informal
systems); pitted ‘conflicts justice’ against alternative aspirations such as econ-
omic efficiency; dealt variously in individual rights or legal systems; included
unrecognised states and indigenous peoples; wheeled between public law and
private law; experimented with substantive rules, principles of deference or
subsidiarity; became torn between attachment to neutrality and the pursuit
of values; oscillated between community-building and the dictates of sover-
eignty; provided the emblematic space to explore the virtues of rules and stan-
dards, security and flexibility; explored the limits of toleration and still swings
constantly from faith in universalism to resignation before irreducible cultural
interpretations.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that private international legal method-
ology – albeit substantially revisited – has attracted new attention47 to the
point of being posited by Gunter Teubner as the only plausible content of
45 Annabel S Brett, Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law (Prin-
ceton University Press, 2011).
46 Nico Krisch, ‘The Structure of Postnational Authority’ in Cotterrell and del Mar (n 12) forthcoming.
47 See Knop, Michaels and Riles (n 29); see too, Lars Viellechner, ‘Responsive Legal Pluralism: The Emer-
gence of Transnational Conflicts Law’ (2015) 6(2) Transnational Legal Theory 312.
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‘global societal constitutionalism’.48 As flagged by the citation at the beginning
of this text, such a claim will be taken very seriously throughout the develop-
ments that follow. A similar statement is made by Paul Berman, who recog-
nises in the context of global legal pluralism that ‘these [private international
law] doctrines become a core way of navigating the interactions, using prin-
ciples that navigate between legal formalism and political practicality’.49 In
this respect, the conflict of laws contains a sophisticated arsenal of methodo-
logical principles which fit the pluralist idea of coordination. Choice of law
rules and standards, diverse ‘approaches’, theories of incidental application,
renvoi and (with a pinch of imagination) subsidiarity, deference and delibera-
tive polyarchy are all but a few of the techniques at its disposal with which it
can offer the navigation map that legal pluralism arguably lacks. Arguably, the
conflict of laws would have been able to ‘set the ground-rules for interaction
among relative authorities’,50 with a little nudging. Nor need it be disdained as
a clever toolbox. It has a rich jurisprudence of rights (transitory or not), law
(including the status of foreign law), comity, sovereignty, coordination and
tolerance. Recently, it has appeared as a sophisticated repository for interdis-
ciplinarity,51 providing a discursive framework that structures thought52 as an
epistemology of complex systems53 or a new launch-pad for global
governance.54
Like the return of science,55 the revival of the conflict of laws is on the
cards! The discipline appears as a serious candidate for occupying a significant
governance function in ‘global legal space’ defined as beyond the reach and
out of bounds of state sovereignty or state-endorsed institutions. After all,
its line of business has long been making sense of interactions that cross
state boundaries and fall between the gaps between domestic sovereignty
and public international law. At the same time, however, complacency
would be largely misplaced. The conflict of law’s contemporary intellectual
abeyance certainly warrants a humble detour by the various thriving
strands of global legal theory.56 Indeed, it may have much to learn from
48 Teubner (n 1).
49 On the flip side of this move is the new prominence of constitutionalism. ‘If…we see constitutionalism
as setting the ground-rules for interaction among relative authorities, constitutionalism becomes more
important than ever’ (Berman (n 24) forthcoming).
50 Ibid.
51 Once again, Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels and Annelise Riles (eds), ‘Transdisciplinary Conflict of Laws’
(2008) 71(3) Law and Contemporary Problems.
52 As Knop, Michaels and Riles claim, it provides a template for lateral and reflexive thinking, useful for
navigating cultural conflicts, including clashes of feminism and tradition: ibid.
53 See Horatia Muir Watt, ‘New Challenges in Public and Private International Legal Theory: Can Compara-
tive Scholarship Help?’ in Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law
(Hart Publishing, 2004) 271.
54 See Horatia Muir Watt and Diego Fernandez Arroyo (eds), Private International Law and Global Govern-
ance (Oxford University Press, 2015).
55 Pomper and Shaw (n 3).
56 For an overview and tenative classification of these strands, see Walker (n 6).
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other disciplinary vocabularies, either about the definition of conflicts or their
modes of resolution, and this could lead in turn to a radical reformulation of
its own core issues. Indeed, if encounters between heterogeneous norms or
expressions of diverse types of informal authority are central to the under-
standing of the normative landscape beyond the confines of state sover-
eignty,57 the traditional schemes of intelligibility which underlie the conflict
of laws need to take on board various additional dimensions of global com-
plexity. If it does so and succeeds in living up to this challenge, it may
emerge considerably enlightened by global legal theory. However, the
reverse is true too.
What follows then is something in the way of a co-productive,58 inter-
disciplinary effort. Several thorny issues or choices confront both the con-
flict of laws and legal pluralism when they claim relevance outside inter-
national or infra-state contexts, respectively. This paper proposes to
explore the ways in which the former can gain from (and contribute
to) the newer insights of the latter. It will first revisit the anatomy of ‘con-
flict’ under these two approaches. In comparing their respective percep-
tions of normative interaction, it appears then that the conflict of laws
approach focuses more tellingly on the underlying stakes, but needs in
turn to take on board the complexity and centrality of normative
overlap as emphasised by legal pluralism (I). It will be shown how this
could potentially lead to a radically new reading of the very ‘matrix’ of
the private international law discipline. Indeed, its traditional spotlight
is on antagonistic individual claims invoked by different right-holders,
so that rights have tended to become the focus of conflict of laws analysis.
But an alternative approach (inspired by Gunter Teubner’s societal con-
stitutionalism) understands such individual rights-claims to be the
visible expression of conflicts on a deeper level as involving ‘anonymous’
social systems. The implications of this idea for the conflict of laws will be
explored (II). A further transformation resulting from this encounter
between the conflict of laws and legal pluralism concerns the perspective
from which questions of theoretical import are asked. When pluralism
advocates a heterarchical and reflexive approach to any form of legal
overlap, private international law is able to make available a supportive
methodological framework that can respond to the usual critiques levelled
at pluralism’s inability to solve conflicts or to its lack of normative
horizon (III).
57 For a critique, in turn, of Walker’s own conceptions as being tainted by a state-focused paradigm, see
Ruth Buchanan, ‘Reconceptualizing Law and Politics in the Transnational Constitutional and Legal Plur-
alist Approaches’ Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research Paper No. 19/2008 (Osgoode
Hall Law School, Toronto, 2008).
58 On interdisciplinary co-production of knowledge, see Sheila Jasanoff and Olivier Leclerc, Le droit et la
science en action (Dalloz, 2013).
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As will be seen in the conclusion to this article, practice has unfortunately
not waited for these insights. Are we on the way, then, to a legal-pluralist
revival of the conflict of laws?
II. The anatomy of conflict
What’s in a conflict?59 ‘Conflicts’ within the meaning of the conflict of laws
are notoriously more complex than they might seem at first sight. They are
not necessarily understood as confrontational. Sometimes indeed, they are
‘false’.60 In other instances, they imply that a law deliberately ‘offers’ its com-
petence but will defer to a refusal.61 More frequently, they signify that several
laws are simultaneously available for possible use, to the extent that they all
include the issue at hand in their scope or all accept to serve as default
rules for international contracts. Only occasionally do they really involve
mutually exclusive claims to regulate.62 And yet again, some such claims
may be merely ‘incidental’.63 In turn, legal pluralism suggests that norms
meet, clash or combine independently of state borders according to multiple
patterns of instable and recursive interaction in global context. Comparing
these perceptions of normative interaction shows the conflict of laws
approach to focus more tellingly on the underlying stakes, on the condition,
however, that its templates integrate the greater complexity (A) and the very
centrality of hybrid normative encounters (B).
A. Close encounters: a third kind?
Private international law understands ‘conflict’ in terms of three distinct ideal
types: simultaneous assertions of jurisdiction in respect of a single situation or
the issues to which it gives rise are theorised as giving rise to either confronta-
tion, cooperation or competition between the contending laws or legal
systems. Correlatively, three main methodologies – unilateralism,
59 The alternative to the unsatisfactory vocabulary of conflicts is to talk about ‘private international law’,
but again everyone knows that the private is problematic, that the international is too state-centred,
and that non-state norms can only gingerly be included in the concept of ‘law’. Do the semantics
really matter if despite the hiatus between the terms and their meaning, the convention is sufficiently
clear? It is likely that they do, at least when the context has changes so much that the words convey an
entirely contrary meaning. The time-worn vocabulary may explain at least in part why conflicts seems so
parochial to global legal theory, as Walker (n 6) observes. Perhaps it would be better to spell out con-
flicts as ‘de-centered, reflexive coordination of global legal interactions’.
60 As in Brainerd Currie’s ‘governmental interest analysis’: B Currie, Selected Essays on the Conﬂict of Laws
(WS Hein, 1963), where a conflict is ‘false’ when only one state has an interest in pursuing its policy in a
given case (for a comprehensive overview, see Lea Brilmayer, ‘Governmental Interest Analysis: A House
Without Foundations’ (1985) 46 Ohio State Law Journal 459, online: <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.
edu/fss_papers/2512>.
61 As in renvoi.
62 As in ‘lois de police’ or overriding mandatory norms.
63 Incidental application, or ‘giving effect’ (see Regulation (EC) No 593/2008, Article 9 (Rome I)) or prise en
consideration.
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multilateralism and party choice – each provide, in ideal form, a response to
the particular problems thus defined. Theorised in the course of the past
century – largely in the wake of various political projects involving the estab-
lishment of liberalism, the story of state sovereignty, the modern international
public legal order – the discipline’s approach to the interactions between
plural, conflicting norms naturally bears the marks of the great simplifica-
tions64 of modern law’s ‘mythodology’.65 This approach’s main challenge
was to grapple with territorial monopoly, in order to craft the ways in
which the ‘relevance’66 of foreign systems might find expression despite the
constraints of the legal framework imposed by public international law.
With varying degrees of (im)plausibility, doctrines such as vested rights, tran-
sitory torts, the perception of foreign law as fact, were all attempts to by-pass
the legal impregnability of the nation-state boundaries which global pluralism
dismisses as increasingly irrelevant today. However, globalisation weakens the
claim of these fictions to any plausible description of the postnational world,
or the forms which law takes ‘beyond the state’. As Berman again points out:
‘[W]hat we might be done with is the (perhaps always fictitious) idealized
vision of the nation-state as a single authority operating autonomously
within bounded territory.’67
In stark contrast to the traditional, simplified view of conflicts stands the
post-modernist viewpoint of global legal pluralism. As Neil Walker muses,
the intimated features of ‘global law’ take on the dynamic, unstable and recur-
sive characteristics of the complex processes that it claims to capture.68 One of
the comparative attractions of global legal pluralism is to reflect in its meth-
odology the intense circulation of ideas and the constant mutual irritation, the
‘in-between worlds’ which ‘interlegality’ produces.69 Embracing instability,
contingency, dynamics, disorder, polyarchy in its definition of interactions
between normative orders, global-pluralist legal theory sees ‘the state and
the interstate system as complex social fields in which state and non-state,
local and global social relations interact, merge and conflict in dynamic and
64 The Peace of Westphalia had produced order out of normative chaos by creating sovereign territorial
monopolies and correlative assumptions, ideals, beliefs and dogma about the reach, nature and foun-
dations of the law. These also shaped the conceptualisation of the ‘overflow’ – the remaining conflicts
beyond the boundaries of each sovereign state, to which private international methodology applies. If
law, including international law, functions according in systematic and hierarchical mode and tends
towards stability, unity, coherence and certainty; the space beyond the state must in turn be subject
to such order.
65 This term is a wordplay upon the authentic version of Peter Fitzpatrick’s The Mythology of Modern Law
(Routledge, 1992).
66 This was the term used by Santi Romano to describe the relationships between social systems. At a time
when the conflict of laws was dominated by a sovereignty paradigm, it was used to break through an
overly formalist conception of the relationship between the legal systems, notably that of the forum and
foreign law (see Romano (n 33)).
67 Berman (n 24) forthcoming.
68 See Walker (n 6) 148.
69 Marc Amstutz, ‘In-Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning’
(2005) 11(6) European Law Journal 766.
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even volatile combinations’.70 Indeed, the vocabulary and the metaphors are
highly revealing: collisions, interaction, merging, recursivity, interwoven
diversity, mutual provocation, in-between worlds, irritations, interferences
(understood in an electrical mode), disruptions or distortions are all used
by pluralists to express multiple new patterns of encounters between legal
systems.71
This pluralist vision certainly suggests a richer understanding of the ‘inter-
minglings’ between social systems than the three horizontal schemes of
coordination, competition and confrontation to be found within the paradigm
of the conflict of laws. Beyond its obvious focus on confrontation, the term
‘conflict’ – curiously understood to cover complementarity – does not ade-
quately express mutual ‘irritations’ that set off a series of unpredictable and
potentially far-reaching consequences when the internal make-up of each
system differs.72 Nor does an overly static vision do justice to the dynamics
of these interactions with which, in practice, the conflict of laws itself has
to cope in the form of strategic navigation by private actors of multiple
regimes (from fiscal and investment regimes to familiar forum shopping for
procedural tools).73 Indeed, strategic u-turns and the resort to clawbacks
and counter-measures are so much part of the global picture that the
concept of ‘fraud on the law’ – a pillar of continental general theory designed
to neutralise attempts to circumvent the ‘natural’ forum – has been rendered
impotent.74 In turn, EU law draws attention to the diagonal dimensions of
conflicts in multi-layered systems.75 Furthermore, using the pluralist frame-
work of societal constitutionalism, Teubner attempts a classification of
regime collisions which signals the increased new intricacy of ‘problem
areas’. These are ‘(1) the collision of a particular sub-rationality with other
70 Berman (n 24) forthcoming, quoting Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense:
Law, Globalization, and Emancipation (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 94.
71 They fit the post-modern paradigm of the tentacular rhizome (Deleuze), and the accelerated intensity of
hyper-reality (Baudrillard).
72 Gunter Teubner has famously drawn attention to the ‘irritations’ that occur when systems enter into
contact with each other through ‘legal transfers’, setting off a series of unpredictable and potentially
far-reaching consequences when the internal balance (the social couplings) within the two systems
differs: Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in
New Divergences’ (1998) 61(1) Modern Law Review 11.
73 The notorious Chevron litigation provides the supreme example, promising a legal battle made of
measures and countermeasures throughout the world, ‘until the oceans run dry’. For convenience,
see the multiple references in Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Chevron, l’enchevêtrement des fors. Un combat
sans issue?’ (2011) 100(2) Revue critique de droit international privé 339.
74 Despite free movement, the concept lingers, however: see in the case of the French prohibition on sur-
rogacy arrangements, and the refusal to recognize the civil status of children born of such agreements
abroad on grounds of fraude à la loi: Mennesson v France [2014] ECtHR n°65192/11 and Labassee v
France [2014 ECtHR] n°65941/11 (regarding violation of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) art 8).
75 Christian Joerges, ‘The Idea of a Three-Dimensional Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form’ in Christian
Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social
Regulation (Hart, 2006) 491–528; Jeremy Heymann, Le droit international privé à l’épreuve du fédéralisme
européen (Economica, 2010).
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sub-rationalities; (2) collision with a comprehensive rationality of world
society; and (3) the collision of the function-maximization with its own self-
reproduction’.76 Among the ‘intimations’ of global law, Walker points out the
‘double deformalisation’ which transforms ‘the paradigm conflicts case…
between state legal orders which are symmetrical and largely mutually exclusive’
so as to include ‘trade andmix of first-order authority between regimes with quite
different but often significantly overlapping substantive jurisdictions’.77
Significantly, awareness of the pervasive complexity of normative inter-
action78 is also a feature of all the other disciplines that have positioned them-
selves to survey or regulate (from various standpoints) the global legal
landscape. Outside the conflict of laws, then, the new global problematic is
that of ‘conflicts’. Legal sociology explores the ‘no-man’s-land in which differ-
ent normative orders collide because different spheres of meaning (Sinnwel-
ten) are colliding’.79 Comparative law, renewing its alliance with
anthropology and global history, explores the dynamics of legal transfer
and the contested internal make-up of each legal culture, full of ‘unofficial
portraits’ and informal sub-cultures.80 Human rights theory, now indissoci-
able from its own set of critical strands, has taken on board the inter-section-
ality of identities81 and moreover shows up the contestations which takes
place within the discourse of human rights itself. The spate of recent cases
that have come up inWestern societies in relation to the diverse cultural prac-
tices of immigrant populations illustrates the multiple standpoints which can
emerge in a conflict otherwise framed in apparently univocal terms. Wearing
a full-veil or burqa in a secular (or mono-religious) society which prohibits
ostensible (or non-orthodox) religious wear in public82 can be viewed
76 Teubner (n 1) 81. He adds, ominously: ‘The evolutionary dynamics of these three collisions certainly
have the potential to result in a societal catastrophe.’ He references Niklas Luhmann: ‘the occurrence
of catastrophe is contingent. It depends on whether countervailing structures will emerge which
prevent the positive feedback catastrophe’. On the methodology which is suitable to take up this chal-
lenge, see Section II of this article.
77 Walker (n 6) 114.
78 de Sousa Santos (n 70) 437: ‘different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed in our
minds, as much as in our actions, either on occasions of qualitative leaps or sweeping crises in our
life trajectories, or in the dull routine of eventless everyday life’.
79 Poul F Kjaer, ‘The Concept of the Political in the Concept of Transnational Constitutionalism’ in Christian
Joerges and Tommi Ralli (eds), After Globalization: New Patterns of Conflict and Their Sociological and
Legal Re-construction (ARENA Report No 4/11, RECON Report No 15) 285–321, 315, online: <http://
pure.au.dk/portal/files/70590248/After_Globalization.pdf>.
80 See Frankenberg (n 17); Mitchel de S-O-l’E Lasser, ‘Judicial (Self-) portraits: Judicial Discourse in the
French Legal System’ (1995) 104(6) Yale Law Journal 1325. The internal complexity of legal cultures
explains why forced legal transplants act as ‘irritants’ (Teubner (n 1)) producing unpredictable conse-
quences in their adoptive environment: importing an isolated institution cannot be the end of the
story, since the internal complexity of a legal tradition will produce new patterns, fuelling disruption
and new combinations.
81 The term was coined by Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ in David Kairys
(ed), The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (Pantheon, 2nd edn 1990) 195–217.
82 See the position of French law as analysed in ECtHR, SAS v France [2014] n° 43835/11.
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diversely as an identitarian assertion in the name of self-expression, a femi-
ninist stance, a form of resistance against the perceived repressive nature of
state secularism, a practice mandated, encouraged or condoned by a foreign
law governing personal status, a submissive gesture within a sexist sub-
culture or the sign of deep social unrest in a class-based system. In legal
terms, it could take the form of a human rights claim,83 a traditional issue
of applicable law (personal status), an instance that requires a political accep-
tation of foreign or religious cultures in a multicultural society,84 or a national
security event.85 A proportionality analysis has to weigh in all these view-
points and is certainly better equipped methodologically to embrace this
multi-faceted situation than any single perspective.86
From the standpoint of legal pluralism, bringing to bear the lens of a con-
flict of laws analysis will facilitate the analysis of sensitive cases of mutual irri-
tation between hybrid regimes – whether or not in a transnational context.
Once the ‘conflict’ is identified, its multiple dimensions are better grasped
and ultimately, the needs of each system more appropriately accommodated.
As Berman says:
[C]onceiving of these clashes between religious and state law in conflicts terms
reorients the inquiry in a way that takes more seriously the non-state commu-
nity assertion. As a result, courts must wrestle both with the nature of the mul-
tiple community affiliations potentially at issue and with the need to articulate
truly strong normative justifications for not deferring to the non-state norm.87
If it is willing to take on the greater complexity, the conflicts approach, then, is
right.88 Thus, on the one hand, pluralism could gain by ‘conceiving of a battle
between state and non-state law in terms of conflicts doctrine [which] will
tend to change the framework of decision’.89 Putting conflicts in the limelight
allows multiple complex stakes to surface. Conversely, the potential contri-
bution of pluralism to the conflict of laws would be to make ‘the choice-of-
law decision a constructive terrain of engagement among multiple normative
83 Ibid.
84 On recognition in such a context, which is both an element of societal dialogue and a conflict of laws
problematic, see Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Fundamental Rights and Recognition in Private International Law’
(2013) 3 European Journal of Human Rights 409.The recognition concept in Hegel’s early social philoso-
phical works (on ‘struggle for recognition’: kampf um anerkennung) is re-read by Axel Honneth in The
Struggle for Recognition: Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Polity Press, 1996). Similarly, Charles Taylor’s
Hegelian scholarship inspires his own work on recognition within a multicultural society: Hegel and
Modern Society (Cambridge University Press, 1979); Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recog-
nition (Princeton University Press, 1994).
85 See the reasons (as invoked by the French government) for the French prohibition of (full) veil in public
spaces, in SAS v France (n 82).
86 On the complexity of proportionality itself as simultaneously mode of reasoning, technique and conflict
rule (institutional competence): see Yetano (n 39).
87 Berman (n 24) forthcoming.
88 The passage goes on: ‘Because non-state law-making is not usually conceived of as law, we do not
usually think of clashes between state and non-state law through the prism of conflict-of-laws jurispru-
dence. But we could’: ibid.
89 Ibid, forthcoming.
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systems, rather than an arm of state government automatically and without
reflection imposing its normative vision on all within its coercive power’.90
The latter description might of course appear to conflicts lawyers to be a
reductive view of what conflicts law actually does. Nevertheless, following
this path would undeniably enlarge the jurisdiction of the conflict of laws
to encompass social conflicts of all types, whether or not the crossing of
state borders is concerned. The ‘irritant’ that this might represent, however,
now needs to be addressed in turn.
B. Mainstreaming conflicts
For the conflict of laws, framing these interactions in the alternative vocabu-
lary of global legal pluralism emphasises their omnipresence and expresses the
idea that they are no longer (as they were in a pre-global setting) simply mar-
ginal encounters between territorially bounded legal systems. ‘Wherever one
looks, there is conflict among multiple legal regimes.’91 An awareness of the
pervasiveness of normative interaction is what sets apart new global versions
of legal pluralism from its more classical antecedents. Thus, as Berman
observes,
Pluralism had always sought to identify hybrid legal spaces, where multiple
normative systems occupied the same social field. And though pluralists had
often focused on clashes within one geographical area, where formal bureauc-
racies encountered indigenous ethnic, tribal, institutional or religious norms,
the pluralist framework proved highly adaptive to analysis of the hybrid legal
spaces created by a different set of overlapping jurisdictional assertions (state
v. state; state v. international body; state v. non-state entity) in the global
arena.92
However, in the case of the conflict of laws, the potential change of course
which would result from an acknowledgement of the ubiquity of conflicts is
not merely quantitative, nor is it limited to a reversal of the respective
scope of principle (domestic cases) and exception (international cases). The
pervasiveness of conflicts means, much more radically, that conflicts are no
longer merely a problem of overflow to be dealt with at the confines of
law’s usual business, but a permanent, all-pervasive feature of the normative
landscape, reflecting the intensity of global processes. If conflicts are now
‘mainstreamed’, as Neil Walker puts it, conventional wisdom stands on its
head,93 and the perception of conflict changes. From simple and marginal
situations of horizontal antagonism or antinomy in international cases, to
situations of pervasive mutual irritation, the phenomena involved are more
90 Ibid, forthcoming.
91 de Sousa Santos (n 78) 94.
92 Berman, ibid, forthcoming.
93 Walker (n 6) 131–47.
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numerous, complex and heterogeneous than are the formal legal systems of
the world of sovereign nation-states.
Putting conflicts at the very core of global law means, first of all, that the
issue of threshold that arises in the conflict of laws – the notoriously difficult
determination of what is ‘international’, as opposed to the purely domestic –
becomes irrelevant. If global encounters between different systems are not
limited to law that is state-endorsed and territorially bound, then there is
no reason to balance out the interests expressed in various normative
systems (laws, standards, principles, indicators) differently, according to
whether they arise within the confines of one state territory or are framed
as involving a problem of conflict of laws. The burqa case discussed above
provides ample illustration of this. The normative conflict arises whether or
not there is a traditional international conflict of laws opposing the personal
status of the veil-wearer and the prohibitive position of the forum. The
required international element does not change the terms of the interactions
involving religion, culture or gender, since even in the absence of a permissive
foreign law, there is a right which trumps the subordinate forum law or an
overriding value (republican neutrality, security considerations, etc.) which
trumps the right. This example also shows up the links between the question
of threshold (when is there a conflict of laws?) and the tricky issue of equal
treatment or non-discrimination. Formulating a right in terms of non-dis-
crimination (on grounds of religion, cultural practice or gender) is a
demand for justification of differential treatment; identifying such grounds
is precisely the problematic which lies at the heart of the conflict of laws.94
Using an alternative vocabulary does not change its terms. The issue of
when justice allows differential treatment persists whether or not there is
an international conflict of laws.
Secondly, putting conflicts in the limelight may contribute a key to the
‘legitimacy conundrum’ which stalls attempts by contemporary pluralists to
respond to the question of the foundations of transnational authority95 and
the nature of law in a world of overlapping claims by ‘unauthorised’ actors
of the ‘second’ modernity.96 Since most analytical jurisprudential expla-
nations are still bound either to sovereignty or the domestic polity,97 they
lose purchase correlatively to nation-states’ ‘loss of control’.98 Various
strands of socio-legal theories and societal constitutionalism turn away,
94 The conflict of laws has long entertained a symbiotic but contradictory relationship with principles of
non-discrimination and equal treatment. See, for example, Douglas Laycock, ‘Equal Citizens of Equal and
Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law’ (1992) 92(2) Columbia Law Review
249; and our analysis: Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Aspects économiques du droit international privé’ (2005) 307
RCADI 29.
95 Cotterrell and Del Mar (n 13).
96 Beck (n 3).
97 On the requirements of sovereignty, see below, Part III, B.
98 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (Columbia University Press, 1996).
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therefore, from governance or constitutionalist projects which tend to project
familiar state-bound structures onto the global scene. In this respect, a first
significant insight from these global-pluralist conceptions is that it is implau-
sible, for the moment, to envisage authority beyond the nation-state in any
form other than concurrent claims.99 This is in keeping with the idea that
global law is aspirational – intimation rather than law made flesh.100 A
further, connected, contribution is that sociological explanations of authority
which were marginal within the doctrinal context of nation-state – such as
Weber’s fourth category of ‘charismatic’ authority – have risen to overriding
importance beyond the state, where expert knowledge, the power of image,
rating agencies and other spin doctors all flourish.101 But however novel, ten-
tative and anti-essentialist, it is striking that this renewed theoretical reflection
does not seem to change the terms of the questions being asked. The jurispru-
dential quest is to grasp the features of law-likeness without the support of the
formal theory of sources of law. When confronted with unaccountable mafia-
like private authority, repressive religious practices or indicators sponsored by
the very entities being assessed, the question is usually whether such phenom-
ena are sufficiently law-like to be considered as law – albeit beyond the state.
Even global law’s eerie ‘intimations’ are seen to present familiar characteristics
in this respect.102 In other terms, the renewed description of intermingling,
hybrid jurisdictional assertions as a new state of global affairs does not
appear to modify the legal consciousness103 into which such claims will
have to fit.
What can a conflict of laws approach bring to this debate? It is true that
when the conflict of laws reached maturity within the framework of the
modern state, it implicitly took statehood as a criterion for assessing the
99 Roger Cotterrell, ‘Transnational Legal Authority: A Socio-legal Perspective’ in Cotterrell and Del Mar (n
12) forthcoming, proposing as a starting point ‘to treat authority generally as a practice and experience
to be identified and interpreted sociologically’. Moreover, ‘given the complex conditions of existence of
transnational legal authority, this authority will be shifting, variable and constantly re-negotiated’.
100 Walker (n 6) 151: global law is ‘an incipient development… a legal form that is still coming to fruition
and so largely future-orientated’.
101 Cotterrell (n 99). This does not mean of course that there is anything more rational about modern law
than about the ‘intimations’ of the global – ‘Were we ever Modern?’, asks Bruno Latour (Nous n’avons
jamais été modernes. Essai d’anthropologie symétrique (La Découverte, 1981)) – but that rationality is
part of the ‘mythodology’ of modern law with which we are now willing to part.
102 Walker sees a common denominator of ratio and volontas in the various conceptualisations of global
law: Walker (n 6) 196–7.
103 Defined in New Oxford Companion to Law as a concept
used to name analytically the understandings and meanings of law circulating in social
relations. Legal consciousness refers to what people do as well as say about law. It is under-
stood to be part of a reciprocal process in which the meanings given by individuals to their
world become patterned, stabilized, and objectified. These meanings, once institutionalized,
become part of the material and discursive systems that limit and constrain future meaning-
making. Consciousness is not an individual trait nor solely ideational; legal consciousness is a
type of social practice reflecting and forming social structures. (New Oxford Companion to Law
(Oxford University Press, 2008))
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legitimacy of the norms it would accept within its ‘community of laws’.104
However, detached from state sovereignty, the additional contribution of
the conflict of laws would be to point to these interactions themselves as
the starting point from which to approach issues of legitimacy. This would
mean dodging the legitimacy question – by avoiding having to sift through
concurrent claims ex ante, since these are all dealt with ex post and in relative
terms. This idea seems perfectly in line with global law’s instable reflexivity. It
suggests that the legitimacy question arises in different terms according to the
type of claim – collaborative, confrontational, concurrent – that is being made
in respect to other legal systems.
For example, is a private corporate code law or not law – legitimate or ille-
gitimate, binding or softly decorative? This might not be the right question to
ask, or the right way to ask it. It may be, for instance, that when a corporate
actor undertakes, in a private code made available to investors, to work
towards a more ethical or egalitarian workplace,105 those commitments
should be binding – and apt to be invoked against it – to the extent that it
is supported by values present in its environment. The same code might
not, however, in other circumstances, serve as governing law.106 Accepting
that legitimacy issues arise ex post and can receive variable, relative answers
according to the type of conflict in which they are involved comes closer to
capturing the complexity of the normative landscape beyond the state. As
Teubner on pluralism reminds us, ‘the primacy of a function system can,
however, only be claimed within a particular local and situational context.
It changes from place to place and from situation to situation’.107 It is time
now to explore the insights to be garnered, in turn, from other elements of
this pluralist approach.
III. Beyond rights: the anonymous matrix?108
The complexity inherent in patterns of ‘conflict’ as enhanced by a pluralist
vision can also be observed in respect of the normative phenomena involved
in these encounters. Under various, traditional, conflict of laws doctrines, the
concept of ‘laws’ has admittedly come to include multiple phenomena (rules
of various types, whole legal systems, judgments or rights). These categories
104 This expression is famously von Savigny’s: Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen
Rechts (Veit, 1849). In von Savigny’s initial formulation of ‘multilateralist’ methodology, only the com-
munities (at the time, German princedoms) belonging to a closed ‘community of laws’ cemented by
shared cultural (religious, linguistic and legal) tradition, were considered as participants in the common
allocation of prescriptive authority.
105 See, for throughly documented examples, Beckers (n 13).
106 As in the case of a global value chain, when competing state norms guarantee improved hygiene,
security or environment for the stakeholders involved, or when fundamental rights are threatened.
107 Teubner (n 1) 64.
108 Or to adopt the May 68 slogan, ‘sous les pavés, la plage’. The ‘anonymous matrix’ is borrowed from
Teubner (n 1), and its meaning will be discussed in detail below.
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are also understood to be the tangible expression of antagonistic sovereign
wills, contradictory policy-driven rules, colliding values, different legal tra-
ditions or mutually exclusive legal orders. But legal pluralism suggests that
the traditional matrix of the conflict of laws may not adequately capture
the complexity of colliding transnational regimes, of which formal law is
only one among many. It moves the focus from traditional state-bound law
to self-referential social systems, inviting a radically new reading of the nor-
mative and social landscape beyond the state (A). While incomplete, the tra-
ditional matrix may also be misleading. The centrality of litigation and the rise
of fundamental rights have put the spotlight on antagonistic individual claims
invoked by different right-holders, so that rights have tended to become the
focus of conflict of laws analysis. An alternative approach understands such
individual rights-claims to be the visible expression of conflicts on a deeper
level, involving ‘anonymous’ social systems (B).
A. Autonomous rationalities
‘Societal constitutionalism’, the specific brand of pluralism advocated by
Gunter Teubner,109 makes a direct connection between its own vision of ‘col-
liding function-systems’ and the conflict of laws.110 It is also deliberately
attuned to the features of the global, and is not therefore merely an extension
of infra-state pluralism to the transnational sphere. As such, it is certainly one
of the most original and productive strands of contemporary global legal
thought. In short, its sociological perspective sees as the central evolution of
late modernity (that is, emerging within the modern state and accentuated
by globalisation), the multiplication of areas of autonomous action in
society, each developing its own formal rationality, in mutual indifference
to each other. It claims a post-structuralist pedigree to the extent that it
was Foucault who first identified ‘radically de-personalizing power phenom-
ena and identifying today’s micro-power relations in society’s capillaries in
the discourses/practices of “disciplines”’.111 This results in ‘escalated differen-
tiation, pluralization, and reciprocal compartmentalization of separate
spheres’.112 Such spheres concern culture, science, the economy, or law, but
109 This theory is developed by Gunter Teubner (n 1) on the basis of insights Niklas Luhman’s theory of
functional differentiation of social spheres. It is emphatically not a theory of global constitutionalism
involving the search for an all-encompassing set of shared principles of world governance, but a plur-
alist perspective. As will be seen, it advocated only one possible common constitutional approach, that
of ‘collision law’, which each node (or forum, in more traditional vocabulary) would define for itself.
110 Christian Joerges has also mooted a version of (three-dimensional) ‘Conflicts Law as Constitutional
Form’: Joerges (n 75). According to this project, meta-conflict rules would allocate competence as
between the different multi-levels of governance (national, supra-national/regional). In this respect,
it seems to assume an overriding conflicts law rather than the reflexive, decentred approach advocated
below.
111 See Teubner (n 1) 74, observing, however, that an inflated perspective of power ‘does not discern the
more subtle effects of other communication media’.
112 Ibid, 39.
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also more specialised sub-spheres such as finance, ecology, human rights or
the lex mercatoria, which will be questioned below. These processes describe
and explain the crisis of politics in the modern state. It is no longer possible
for any authority to represent the whole of society. The political constitution
of the state can no longer channel ‘the collective energies of the whole society,
founding the nation’s unity. In modernity, the collective potential is no longer
available as a whole, but has been dispersed into numerous social potentials,
energies, powers’. This is due to the ‘narrow specialization of the communi-
cative media – power, money, knowledge, law’.113
Like the nation-state emerging in early modernity, these social sub-systems
are self-referential, establishing themselves through processes by which, ex
nihilo, they constitute their own autonomy. The specific contribution of
societal constitutionalism is to analyse this move towards autonomy as the
development by each sphere of its own ‘constitution’.114 Obviously, the
concept of constitution advocated here must be dissociated from the
nation-state.115
Firstly, the constitution should be disconnected from statehood, so that trans-
national issue-specific regulatory regimes may be considered candidates for
constitutionalization. Secondly, the constitution should be decoupled from
institutionalized politics, thus allowing other areas of global civil society to
be identified as possible constitutional subjects. Thirdly, the constitution
should be decoupled from the medium of power, thus making other media
of communication possible constitutional targets.116
The idea advocated by Teubner is then to borrow insights from the discipline
of constitutional sociology, relating both to the conditions surrounding the
113 Ibid, 63. This process is not necessarily negative. It has made possible great achievements of civilization
in the arts, science, medicine, economics, politics and the law even if it has dark sides. More special-
ization is to come: ‘Research, education, healthcare, the media, the arts – globalization offers the
opportunity to strengthen their autonomy’ (Ibid, 82).
114 In terms of systems theory, ‘the political constitutions of nation states have the constitutive function of
securing the autonomy of politics which has been acquired in the modern era in relation to “other”
religious, familial, economic, and military sources of power’: Ibid, 75. In contrast to the former,
however, ‘their self-foundation does not take place through a formally organized collective, but
rather as a communicative self-foundation with no formal organization of the whole system’: Ibid, 67.
115 This is a move constitutional scholars often have trouble making. It is preferred, however, to alternative
terms, such as ‘meta-regulation’, ‘indispensable norms’ or ‘higher legal principles’ which are
inadequate to comprehend the complexity of issues that the concept ‘constitution’ covers.
116 Teubner (n 1) 60. There is serious disagreement here under the wide umbrella of pluralism. Noting that
‘we should abandon, then, the false premise that constitutionalization inevitably means the transform-
ation of a group of individuals into a collective actor’, Teubner warns that ‘concepts which some find
helpful, such as “epistemic community”, “economic community”, or “nomic community” should be
used with extreme caution, since, once again, none of the sociological characteristics of a community
are present’. In this respect, he argues,
Berman’s ideas are therefore problematic, since his anthropological approach always assumes
the presence of culturally defined communities that function as constitutional subjects. In
reality, however, the communities referred to in social constitutions are just imagined identi-
ties, just self-descriptions of their operational unity. (Ibid, 68)
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constitution of social systems, and the contributions made by legal norms to
this process, and then to generalise these insights to non-state systems. Thus, a
constitution dissociated from state requires ‘a legal imagination which can call
upon the founding myth of a collective… a constitution does not necessarily
require a demos, a primordial ethnic group or intermediary structures, but it
does need a legal imagination of revolution and memory’.
In support of this point, it can indeed be observed that even private regimes
have their founding myths, which are at the heart of their constitutions and
legitimise their ‘jurisgenerative power’. Global law itself, in Neil Walker’s
account, has to confront self-referentiality117 and, to do so, creates its own
pedigree by appealing to the past in its own ongoing process of self-consti-
tution.118 This is where, for instance, human rights or the lex mecatoria,
each with particularly powerful mythical imaginaries, appear as possible con-
stitutionalised regimes. Gunter Frankenburg provides a highly plausible
account of human rights narrative as a drama of redemption or occasional
reconciliation, which ‘draws its liberating appeal from the widespread view
that these rights are inventions of reason and justice and therefore very
much incarnate the good in an evil world’.119 In turn, Samuel Moyn points
out the ‘myths of deep origins’ of human rights despite their very recent emer-
gence in global political consciousness.120 Similarly, in respect of the lex mer-
catoria, Teubner shows how the constitutional self-validation of the lex
mercatoria also appeals to the history of ancient trade customs.121 The
117 Walker (n 6) 151: global law is
uncharted law, not yet fully registred in any of our established maps of legal authority. Its pro-
jection, then, involves a gambit, a calculated risk that its explicit self-sponsorship as a form of
law should not be undermined by a prior lack of autorisation.
118 Ibid, 85:
Rather than discontinue older lines of legal thought, the new approaches purport to develop
them… as in Kumm’s insistence on the continuity of cosmopolitan thought across the long
epoch of modernity. Or it may claim even more venerable roots, as in Günther’s claim for
the classical pedigree of law’s universal code, or Tuori’s assertion that ‘deep structure’ is
part of the longue durée of law, supplying a common geological core for successive surface
cultures.
119 Gunter Frankenberg, ‘Human Rights and the Belief in a Just World’ (2014) 12(1) International Journal of
Constitutional Law 35.
120 Moyn (n 9) 212.
121
In the lex mercatoria, the agreements concluded cannot refer back to a national legal consti-
tution. Nevertheless, a constitutional basis has been developed in support of the idea that the
expectations generated by these agreements are legally binding. Instead of referring to a
national constitution, the lex mercatoria calls upon a rich fund of relevant non-legal material
– international trade and transport customs and commercial practices – that developed in the
chaotic environment of the world market. When disputes have to be settled, political and leg-
islative institutions are by-passed and it is claimed, with little basis in fact, that these social
practices have ‘always’ had legal effect and have had constitutional authority since time imme-
morial. Similarly, reference is made to earlier arbitration awards, made not according to exist-
ing national law, but rather according to standards of ‘equity’. These decisions, although they
334 H. MUIR WATT
‘culture of the past’ of the common law122 or the natural rights pedigree of the
civil law tradition are other examples in more traditional spheres. The conflict
of laws itself is no exception; its own ‘saga’ comprises a dramatic narrative of
its foundational moment, as Pierre Gothot has brilliantly shown.123
The requirement of a foundational myth is linked in Teubner’s account to
the constitution’s first essential function, which is to supply a way of dealing
with the ‘paradox of self-reference’124 or how a political system emerges out of
nothing. As he explains in the context of Societal Constitutionalism, self-foun-
dation or ‘mystical self-recursivity’125 is described as a feature of the political
constitutions of nation-states. ‘The self-constituting social system refers to the
law which in turn supports self-foundation.’126 This means that the problem
of self-reference is dealt with as it were by externalising the paradox to the law.
The same phenomenon can be observed in other social systems: their respect-
ive paradoxes of self-foundation are externalised to the law. ‘When a social
system gives itself a legal constitution, it finds an escape from the deficiencies
of self-foundation and its paradoxes.’127 This is well illustrated by the example
of the lex mercatoria, developed below. A second function of constitutions – at
least, of successful constitutions – is to ‘induce limits within each social system
through “self-steering” mechanisms’.128 On the one hand, sub-systemic
rationality can develop pathological, self-destructive tendencies (‘turbo-
autopoiesis’). This compulsive growth dynamic can be seen in the politicisa-
tion, economisation, juridification, medialisation and medicalisation of the
world.129 External political interventions as limits or breaks on these compul-
sive dynamics are therefore necessary to avoid chaos. The example of the
were expressly meant as non-legal (ex aequo et bono), are later referred to as if they were
legally binding precedents, to which the techniques of distinguishing and overruling are
then applied. (Teubner (n 1) 70)
122 Louis Asser-Andrieu, L’ autorité du passé: essai anthropologique sur la common law (Dalloz, 2011).
123 P Gothot, ‘Simples réflexions à propos de la saga du conflit des lois’ in Mélanges en l’honneur de Paul
Lagarde (Dalloz, 2005) 343–54.
124 Teubner (n 1) 108. And,
Systems theory opts for a phenomenon of social communication. Here it is suggested to
understand the ‘pouvoir constituant’ as a communicative potential, a type of social energy, lit-
erally as a ‘power’ which, via constitutional norms, is transformed into a ‘pouvoir constitué’, but
which remains as a permanent irritant to the constituted power. (ibid, 62)
‘The “constitutional subject” is then not simply a semantic artefact of communication, but rather a
pulsating process at the interface of consciousness and communication, resulting in the emer-
gence of the pouvoir constituant’: ibid, 63.
125 Ibid, 104:
We should only speak of constitutions in the strict sense when the medial reflexivity of a social
system – be it politics, the economy, or some other sector – is supported by the law or, to be
more precise, by the reflexivity of the law.
126 Ibid, 144.
127 Ibid, 107.
128 Teubner, ibid, 85.
129 The analysis is applicable to law itself:
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financial system provides excellent evidence here. On the other hand, such
interventions need to be ‘transformed into a self-domestication of the sys-
temic growth dynamic’. This means that they require a form of translation
so as to be integrated within the system in ways the latter can understand,
as it were in its own grammar. ‘Fight fire by fire; fight power by power;
fight law by law; fight money by money’.130
Although societal constitutionalism developed in order to understand
changes which take place within the late-modern state, these ideas apply
equally well to global regimes which cross the boundaries of nation-states.
‘In transnational contexts, it is the issue-specific regimes that form new
kernels around which collective identities crystallize.’131 However, these
regimes are distinctive because their
primary constitutional aim is to dismantle nation-state barriers: to break down
the close structural couplings between the function systems and nation-state
politics and law, and to enable function-specific communications to become
globally interconnected… . Constitutive rules thus serve to unleash the intrin-
sic dynamics of the function systems at the global level. Unburdened by nation-
state restrictions, the systems are now placed to follow, globally, a programme
of maximizing their partial rationality…
This is quite clear in the context of the global economy, where ‘[t]he disman-
tling of national production regimes releases destructive dynamics in the
global systems; destructive dynamics in which the one-sided rationality-max-
imization of one social sector collides with other social dynamics’.132
The most familiar illustration, for private international lawyers, of an
autonomous self-constitutionalising system with ‘destructive growth ten-
dencies’ can be found in the transnational market regime (the global
version of the lex mercatoria133) which has sprung in the past few decades
from the idea of party autonomy. Such a regime of unaccountable private
authority, complete with its own inner logic, structuring principles and
private jurisdictions, prospers notably through extreme liberalisation of arbi-
tration.134 It shows furthermore a marked propensity to expand into
In the case of law, we can clearly see that law not only resolves conflicts and returns to a pos-
ition of rest. Rather, its own regulations actually generate conflicts, which then call for further
regulation. Through its regulatory intervention in daily life, law itself produces the situations
which then give rise to conflicts. And, at the same time, each norm generates problems of
interpretation, which themselves generate further conflicts. Finally, the sheer mass of legal
rules produces rule-conflicts which call for the production of yet more rules. It appears that
the high autonomy of law enhances the number of conflicts. (Ibid)
130 Ibid, 88.
131 Ibid, 66
132 Ibid, 76–9.
133 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime-Collision: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in
the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999.
134 See Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Party Autonomy in Global Context: The Political Economy of a Self-constituting
Regime’ (2015) Japanese Yearbook of Private International Law (forthcoming).
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neighbouring areas such as investment law, where it clashes with other
regimes.135 It has come complete with a philosophical doctrine designed to
legitimate the ‘regulatory lift-off’ it has achieved, in respect of limits contained
either in the laws of nation-states or indeed, as the context of investment arbi-
tration shows, fundamental rights.136 This is largely ‘how private corporate
actors govern’.137 In Teubner’s words, ‘corporate constitutional politics
have successfully dismantled nation-state production regimes whenever
they impede the global expansion of corporate activities’.138 But why has
the market regime’s own environment not secreted limits which the system
might internalise?
One answer is that the conflict of laws has played a considerable role in the
career of this particular functional regime by its eager espousal of unlimited
‘party autonomy’, or contractual freedom of choice of the governing law,
which fulfils a key function within the global political economy of private
ordering. In this respect, while the principle emerged as part and parcel of
the ‘mythodology’ of modern law, it has also worked, less visibly, to destabilise
modernity’s assumptions about the relationship between law and sovereignty,
which are now at the heart of the theoretical turmoil within the traditional
legal paradigm. Since sovereignty itself is no longer the privilege of the
nation-state, clashes occur between the market regime and the very national
legal orders which are responsible for freeing the genie of the lamp. The
market regime also clashes with alternative rationalities, such as culture or
ecology, or indeed with human rights, which as we shall now see may also
be expressing, sub rosa, the rationalities of the latter. It is on this last point
that the societal constitutionalist analysis takes these legal-pluralist insights
further in a way that is equally stimulating for conflicts lawyers.
B. Impersonal rights
Periodically, the conceptual starting point of the conflict of laws analysis
moves from systems, abstract rules, policy orientations or values, to rights.
The rights model was initially adopted within the common law tradition
(in the form of Dicey’s vested rights), and, after a period of dominance of
the civilian conception of concurrent legal orders,139 it is now dominant
once again in the very different context of international and regional
135 See Horatia Muir Watt, ‘The Contested Legitimacy of Investment Arbitration and the Human Rights
Ordeal: The Missing Link’ in Walter Mattli and Thomas Dietz (eds), International Arbitration and
Global Governance: Contending Theories and Evidence (Oxford University Press, 2014) 214–40.
136 Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Aspects philosophiques du droit de l’arbitrage international’ (2007) 329 RCADI
158.
137 Dan Danielson, ‘How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power Seriously in Transnational Regu-
lation and Governance’ (2005) 46(2) Harvard International Law Journal 411.
138 Teubner (n 1) 77.
139 See, for instance, Roberto Ago, ‘Règles générales des conflits de lois’ (1936) 58 RCADI 243; P Mayer, La
distinction entre règles et décisions et le droit international privé (Dalloz, 1973).
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constitutionalism (in the form of human or fundamental rights). In a political
context in which territorial sovereignty supplied a means to resist the border-
less realm of the Catholic Church,140 this model was imagined as a means of
circumventing the monopoly of the law of the forum in order to let in (as it
were through the window) foreign law, suitably tamed and deprived of its
sovereign edge, in the form of previously acquired rights. Its contemporary
expression is the now familiar avenue through which transcending values
of a higher legal order are given primacy over norms that are not conformist,
displacing if necessary the horizontal choice of law rule if it is not attuned to
recognition. In the European context, the Wagner case handed down by the
European Court of Human Rights is the most striking illustration to date of
the impact of fundamental rights on conflict of laws reasoning.141 Here, the
right to a normal family life (article 8 ECHR142) overrides the prohibitive
outcome obtained by applying the choice of law rule of the recognising forum.
While the priority of vested rights was linked to chronology, the primacy of
fundamental rights is a question of content. In both cases, however, the meth-
odological significance of the turn to a rights paradigm is that it points
towards recognition (of existing rights) rather than allocation (of laws
poised for future application). Recognition pre-empts the conflicts of laws
by trumping the application of more restrictive laws. There is much food
for thought here for private international lawyers, who have not yet fully
embraced the suggestion, mooted by Teubner, that human rights might them-
selves ‘take effect as “conflict of law rules” between partial rationalities in
society’.143
Similarly to international law (from which they are deemed to stem),
human rights possess a high profile in contemporary moral consciousness.144
They are indubitably powerful insofar as they are currently the most disrup-
tive language in which ostensibly non-political contestation of existing social
structures can take place.145 As Samuel Moyn points out in The Last Utopia,
their relevance in the past three decades owes much to ‘the desertion of the
140 Joel Paul, ‘Comity in International Law’ (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal 1.
141 Wagner et JMWL v Luxembourg [2007] ECtHR n° 76240/01.
142 ECHR art 8:
Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the econ-
omic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
143 Teubner (n 1) 145.
144 Moyn (n 9) 213.
145 For an illustration, see Colin Scott and Robert Wai, ‘Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct
through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of Transnational ‘Private’
Litigation’ in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand and Gunther Teubner (eds), Transnational Govern-
ance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2004) 287.
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stage by alternative promises to transcend the nation-state’. But it is counter-
productive and even suicidal to compel them to take on all the ‘burden of morality’
which brought other ideologies low – including the embrace of utopian politics or
global governance, which they were not designed to do. Emerging from ‘a yearning
to transcend politics, human rights have become the core language of a new politics
of humanity that has sapped the energy from old ideological contests…’146 and
‘born in the assertion of the power of the powerless they have become bound up
with power of the powerful’. By extending its purview from the mission of cata-
strophe prevention and incorporating aspirations that are emphatically visionary
but necessary divisive, human rights discourse becomes ‘a recipe for the displace-
ment of politics, forcing aspirations for change to present themselves as less contro-
versial than they really are’.147 The point of Moyn’s intervention is that human
rights should leave room for other political utopias to come. ‘Put another way,
the last utopia cannot be a moral one.’148
Integrating the insights of pluralism within the conflict of laws – now
newly placed to solve all manners of global legal interaction – points to a
way, if not of relieving human rights of this tremendous ‘moral burden’, at
least of questioning their epistemological dominance within the law and
thereby clarifying their role within a renewed vision of globalised conflicts.
Pluralist authors such as Ladeur and Teubner insist that it is misplaced to
see the conflicts of laws as colliding rights.149 According to societal constitu-
tionalism, the correct matrix for framing the contemporary conflict of social
systems is ‘anonymous’ or impersonal: ‘on one side of the new equation is no
longer a private actor as the violator of fundamental rights, but the anon-
ymous matrix of an autonomized communicative medium’.150 ‘Both the
“old” state-centred and the “new” poly-contextural human rights question
should be understood as people being threatened not by their fellows, but
by anonymous communicative processes.’151 This means that vertical con-
flicts are not to be understood as involving an individual right-holder
against a state authority, but as pitting the impersonal exigencies of two dif-
ferentiated regimes. Indeed, in this context, ‘fundamental rights are not
defined by the fundamentality of the affected legal interest or of its privileged
status in the constitutional texts, but rather as social and legal counter-insti-
tutions to the expansionist tendencies of social systems’.152 This is necessarily
146 Moyn (n 9) 213.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Methodology and European Law – Can Methodology Change so as to Cope with
the Multicplicity of the Law?’ in Mark van Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative
Law (Hart Publishing, 2004) 91–122. As will be shown below, however, rights claims may be perceived,
on the contrary, as conflict of laws: Teubner (n 1) 143.
150 Teubner, ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
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valid, too, for the horizontal effects of human rights (that is, in the relation-
ships between private actors). Thus, if violations of fundamental rights stem
from the totalising tendencies of sectorial rationalities, there is clearly no
longer any point in seeing their horizontal effect as if rights of private
actors have to be balanced against each other. The ‘imagery of “horizontality”
unacceptably takes the sting out of the whole human rights issue, as if the sole
point of the protection of human rights was that certain individuals in society
threaten the rights of other individuals’.153 ‘Fundamental rights’, as under-
stood here, differ from ‘subjective rights’ in private law as they are not
about mutual endangerment of individuals by individuals, i.e., intersubjective
relations, but rather ‘about the dangers to the integrity of institutions, persons
and individuals that are created by anonymous communicative matrices
(institutions, discourses, systems)’.154
However, although human rights should thus be reinterpreted as expres-
sing underlying rationalities of social systems rather than purely individual
claims, they remain an indispensable heuristic both under current argumen-
tative conventions155 and given the constraints of litigation.156 Interestingly,
though, through their use in this respect, they actually take on the function
of conflict of law rules. ‘By protecting, for instance, the integrity of art,
family, or religion against totalitarian tendencies of science, media, or
economy, fundamental rights take effect as “conflict of law rules” between
partial rationalities in society.’157 The fact that human rights are not to be
taken at surface value makes them appear all the more indispensable within
the project of societal constitutionalism. The normative agenda of the latter
is to ‘construct constitutionally guaranteed counter-institutions in different
social areas’. In other words, to put a break on the growth proclivity of auton-
omous systems. Usefully in such a context, ‘fundamental rights act not only as
spaces of individual autonomy, but also as guarantees to include the entire
153 Ibid, 142.
154 Ibid, 143–4.
155 For our attempt to explore a semiotic of legal argument as set out by Duncan Kennedy, in private inter-
national law, see Andrea Bonomi and Gian Paolo Romano (eds), Yearbook of Private International Law
(2012–2013) XIV.
156 The condundrum is that conflicts of social systems still occur through litigation of individual rights:
How can the law describe the boundary conflict, when after all it has only the language of
‘rights’ of ‘persons’ available? Can it, in this impoverished rights talk, in any way reconstruct
the difference between conflicts of fundamental rights that are internal to society (person-
related) and external to society (human-related)? Here we reach the limits not only of what
is conceivable in legal doctrine, but also the limits of court proceedings. In litigation there
must always be a claimant suing a defendant for infringing his rights. In this framework of
mandatory binarization as person/person-conflicts, can human rights ever be asserted
against the structural violence of anonymous communicative processes? (Teubner (n 1) 146)
157 Ibid, 145.
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population into the function systems’.158 Obviously, this new function does
not solve the problem of overload as described by Moyn. But it helps see
behind the monolith and invites acknowledgement of their (here, epistemo-
logical) contingency. Beyond rights, the question, now, is to frame an ade-
quate methodology to deal with conflicts framed as collisions between two
function-systems each obeying its own inner logic. This is where perspective
comes, as it were, into the (renewed) picture.
IV. Questions of perspective
A significant epistemological feature of global legal pluralism lies in the
necessarily de-centred perspective it advocates for envisaging modes of com-
munication of social systems beyond the state.159 A similar displacement of
perspective is an equally important part of contemporary thinking in other
related fields engaged in critical reflection on law under globalisation. It can
be seen, for example, in comparative law and anthropology, which reverse
the relationship between centre and periphery and explore the spread of
ideas and institutions (legal transfers) from the point of view of the receiving
(colonised or neo-colonised) legal order.160 A similar stance is adopted by
critical strands of public international law, which seek to bring third-word
perspectives into a field which is largely dominated by a Western, capitalist
centre (TWAIL studies).161 Further instances can be found within human
rights doctrine, which has incorporated standpoint analysis first advocated
by gender and subaltern studies.162 In all these cases, the epistemology has
normative underpinnings in pluralist values of mutual tolerance. It is trite
but nevertheless striking in the light of these recent developments elsewhere,
that de-centring also has a long intellectual history within the conflict of
laws.163 Therefore, when legal pluralism advocates a heterarchical, reflexive
approach to manage polycentric interactions among social systems, the con-
flict of laws is able to make available a supportive methodological framework
(A). Moreover, in response to the usual critiques of pluralism, it shows that
pursuing open-ended mutual accommodation does not exclude drawing the
line at the threshold of tolerance nor does it contradict the requirements of
sovereignty, wherever vested (B).
158 Ibid, 137.
159 Walker (n 9) 151 and onward, on the importance of the epistemic dimensions of global law.
160 Frankenberg (n 17).
161 Third World Approaches to International Law. See Richard Falk, Balakrishnan Rajagopal and Jacqueline
Stevens (eds), International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice (Routledge, 2008).
162 See Muir Watt (n 84).
163 Recognizing that a right only vests as long as there is a legal system to support it was a breakthrough
both in the Continental European tradition, which thereupon renounced the universalist ideal, and in
strands of neo-statuism influenced by US legal realism, which thereupon denounced a certain rights
fetishism which had pervaded overly formal doctrines of the conflict of laws.
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A. Recursive reflexivity: conflicts unilateralism in network mode
The de-centring enterprise natural to ‘the pluralist structure of postnational
law’164 excludes any overriding perspective from which to view autonomous
social regimes and order them in any reassuring semblance of hierarchy. The
appropriate methodology must necessarily take the form of mutual accommo-
dation. What, then, should be done about true or irremediable conflicts? A
similar difficulty seems poised to be carried over into global space: however
descriptively adequate and normatively attractive, pluralist theories are
surely of little use once the autonomy of normative regimes and the
ensuing competition for supremacy are established.
The conflict of law reached a similar conclusion long before contemporary
globalisation, in respect of unilateralist doctrines. While normatively attrac-
tive, unilateralism suffered from its radical inability to solve problems of over-
laps and gaps, since it could offer no overarching perspective from which to
choose between conflicting laws equally applicable or non-applicable. The
problem was a stock of ‘orphaned’ relationships,165 or in the more recent
vocabulary of functionalist methodologies, ‘unprovided-for cases’ before
which even policy analysis was seen to stall.166 Renvoi, which is basically a
unilateralist stance within multilaterism,167 is similarly and notoriously vul-
nerable to an ‘unending tennis match’ unless chance comes up with two iden-
tical connecting factors in succession. How helpful is it, then, for the conflict
of laws to succumb to the pluralist siren of a more fluid or ‘liquid’ frame168 in
which the degree of authority of colliding norms remains undefined. In short,
how do you actually solve the conflicts? When pushed on this point, however,
legal pluralists agree on the fact that there comes a time where some sort of
limit has to be drawn.169 The threshold of toleration is conceived as some-
thing similar to the exception of public policy in the conflict of laws; correctly
analysed, this exception actually belongs to a unilateralist–pluralist scheme in
the conflict of laws.170
164 Krisch (n 46) forthcoming.
165 In the words of JP Niboyet, who switched to unilateralism after being convinced of the virtues of
renvoi: JP Niboyet, Traité de droit international privé français, 7 vols (Sirey, 1938–1950).
166 Larry Kramer, ‘The Myth of the “Unprovided-For” Case’ (1989) 75 Virginia Law Review 1045.
167 As are other components of the ‘general theory’ of the conflict of laws, such as preliminary questions
and characterization lege causae. See (n 156).
168 Krisch (n 46) forthcoming.
169 See the debate on this point between Patterson and Galan, with Berman: Galán and Patterson (n 28);
and Berman’s response: Paul Schiff Berman, ‘How Legal Pluralism Is and Is Not Distinct from Liberalism:
A Response to Alexis Galán and Dennis Patterson’ (2013) 11(3) International Journal of Constitutional
Law 801.
170 For a diptychon of the two methodological types and the specific implications of each, see Didier
Boden, ‘L’ordre public: limite et condition de la tolérance. Recherches sur le pluralisme juridique’
(PhD International Law thesis, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne 2002). According to this
author, the two templates were progressively mixed up, for the lack of a clear theoretical conception
of the inner logic of each. Multilateralism then uses such techniques as renvoi or characterisation lege
causae, or the public policy exception, which are logically part of unilateralism.
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This is where it becomes interesting to follow the lead of societal constitu-
tionalism in order to understand what the de-centred standpoint implies in
terms of methodology. According to this strand, at the start, a de-centred
standpoint means reasoning in terms of networks and nodes, rather than hier-
archy or monism. This is a familiar move in legal theory. Networks, in the
place of hierarchy, have already become the new mode of conceptualising
relationships between more traditional legal systems, and provide an alterna-
tive model for the international legal order challenged by fragmentation.171 Its
avatars are the judicial dialogue at regional level and various recent develop-
ments in the case law of the European regional courts in respect of their
mutual relationships, and those with other international authorities.172 Fur-
thermore, the influence of economic theories of regulation inspired by
systems theory have carried networks into the very heart of private law: the
‘organisational contract’ is a networked structure, which transcends more tra-
ditional categories of contract, tort and corporation.173
On the one hand, as a matter of structure, ‘networks are an institutional
answer to rationality conflicts that result from the differentiation and auton-
omization of systems, in our context of transnational function regimes’.174
They are ‘a peculiar combination of bilateral individual relations and multi-
lateral overall co-ordination’ which responds to ‘the fragile co-existence of
different, mutually contradictory normative orders of the network
nodes’.175 On the other hand, as a matter of method, reasoning in terms of
networks in respect of conflicting social systems implies a specific form of
reactivity of each node to its environment, and vice versa, which Krisch has
named ‘recursive reflexivity’.176 This phenomenon is explained by Gunter
Teuber in the following way: ‘networks offer an institutional answer to con-
flicts of norms by transforming… external contradictions into internal
imperatives of the network nodes, which can be made situatively compatible
with one another’. Networks ‘translate the external contradictions manifested
171 François Ost and Michel van de Kerchove, De la pyramide au réseau? Pour une théorie dialectique du
droit (Presses des Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis, 2002). For a social theory extending networks
from human or fictional legal actors to non-human actors or things. See Bruno Latour, Reassembling
the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford University Press, 2005).
172 See, for example, ECJ, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008]
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P insisting that the international organisations, such as the
Security Council of the United Nations, respect rights constitutive of the EU; applying in turn its
own version of Solange in respect of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava
Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland [2005] Application No 45036/98, 42 EHRR
1. Compare too, for a dialogical reading of these relationships, Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism:
The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford University Press, 2011).
173 Fabrizio Cafaggi, Giuseppe Vettori and Stefan Grundmann (eds), The Organisational Contract: From
Exchange to Long-Term Network Cooperation in European Contract Law (Ashgate Publishing, 2013);
compare Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Governing Networks: A Global Challenge for Private International Law’
(2015) 3 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 352.
174 Teubner (n 1) 159.
175 Ibid, 159.
176 Krisch (n 173).
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in conflicts of norms into the internal perspective of the individual nodes,
which internally reflects the relations between various levels, subsystems,
network nodes, and the overall network’.177 This produces ‘a “paradoxical
structure” of inter-institutional interweaving’ triggered by (pervasive) situ-
ations of conflicting (and by definition, unstable) norms. Here, the
rationality premises of one system are to be exposed to those of the others.
Because modern society has no central authority, all efforts at conflict resol-
ution should be decentralized, they should put pressure on ‘the function
systems to develop a stronger regard for the overall social environment.
Because nobody else can do this’.178
In this respect, an explicit connection between this new reflexive pluralist
approach and the conflict of laws has been made by Gunter Teubner.179 Natu-
rally, and once again, the perception of conflict (here as the mutual interference
of dynamic global processes) mandates the methodology. De-centralised inter-
weaving appears as the most appropriate response to the complex global pro-
cesses described above. The picture which emerges is that of self-contained, self-
referential regimes related by networks, that are exposed, not just to ‘horizontal’
conflicts but also to ‘vertical’ and ‘diagonal’ conflicts specific to multi-layered
governance.180 In response, network nodes ‘internally develop their own con-
flict of laws from which perspective they can decide conflicts of norms’.181
There is no network centre to decide norm conflicts between nodes; rather,
the nodes decide the issues for themselves in a decentralised manner.
Of course, this is far from unheard of in the conflict of laws, albeit in
respect of national legal orders. It looks much like a description of intra-
federal conflict of laws in the American system, where each state manages
conflicts on its own account, within a wider, loose, framework of coordination
provided by the network system (such as full faith and credit or mutual rec-
ognition). Beyond regional structures, Alex Mills has proposed a similar con-
ceptualisation of the conflict of laws in terms of polyarchy, federalism and
peer review.182 Even from a traditional conflict of laws perspective, the
insight according to which each node reacts on its own account to conflicting
signals from its environment, all the while aspiring to some sort of global
coordination, is perfectly comprehensible.183 Indeed, it has long been
177 Teubner (n 1) 159.
178 Ibid, 159
179 Once again, social differentiation mandates a polycentrism which is very far from the contemporary
unifying projects of mega-constitutionalism.
180 See Joerges (n 75). Network theory is seen to fit the heterarchical relations between the various semi-
autonomous levels of multi-level governance within the EU.
181 Teubner (n 1) 159.
182 Alex Mills, ‘Variable Geometry, Peer Governance and the Public International Perspective on Private
International Law’ in Muir Watt and Arroyo (n 54) 245–61.
183 This was no doubt, in another vocabulary, the dominant philosophical theory in continental doctrine in
the twentieth century, which invested the conflict of laws with a function of coordination of particu-
larist viewpoints.
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accepted in this context that (unless there is an international treaty) each legal
system can only decide conflicts for itself – even when it integrates elaborate
devices such as renvoi that purport to integrate the viewpoint of various legal
systems outside itself. This also led to the discovery that there is no such thing
as a subjective right ‘out there’.184 As Wengler showed back in 1933, a right
can only exist from the extremely relative perspective of a particular forum.185
But this cursory glance at the history of the conflict of laws also shows that,
conceivably, each node might function in a closed mode, as under particularist
multilateralism during the twentieth century.186 The difference then is in the
requirement of reflexivity, which leads each node to evolve by integrating the
information its receives from its environment. Thus, reflexivity takes the idea
a step further and requires that ‘each node then has the responsibility to incor-
porate into its internal perspective the norms of the other nodes as well as
those of the overall order’.187 Once again, however, this clearly rings a bell.
Under the intellectual influence of Rolando Quadri,188 the unilateralist
revolt against mainstream multilateralism explicitly rejects the closure of
the latter and embraces a more complete attention to the other which is cer-
tainly more in line with the methodological dictates of reflexive pluralism. The
traditional reflexive devices of the ‘general theory’ of the conflict of laws –
renvoi, preliminary questions and characterisation lege causae – are each,
after all, borrowed from unilateralist methodology.189
Moreover, reflexive responses to the conflict of laws have regularly surfaced
in ‘cosmopolitan substantive’190 or synthetic forms. Indeed, the proposal for-
mulated by Teubner in cases of conflicts involving transnational specialised
regimes (such as a conflict between party autonomy and the requirements
of health, culture, finance or the environment), is for a ‘substantive law
approach’, which
takes up elements from the conflicting constitutional norms in each case and
reflects these in the shape of a new substantive norm oriented at the same
time towards the ‘ordre public transnational’. This leads to a form of hybrid
law as, from the viewpoint of the deciding authority, the substantive norm
184 As opposed to a fundamental right, which does not need to be created by one of the national laws in
conflict.
185 Wilhelm Wengler, ‘The General Principles of Private International Law’ (1961) 104 RCADI 273; Francois
Rigaux, ‘Les situations juridiques individuelles dans un système de relativité générale’ (1989) 213 RCADI
9, 84 onward.
186 When equipped with a mechanism such as renvoi which operates ‘as if’ the system were open, it
demonstrates the intrusion of unilateralist–pluralist elements.
187 Teubner (n 1)160. This sophisticated account of societal constitutionalism yields the idea of a differen-
tiated collision-law or conflict of laws analysis, as applicable to normative orders beyond the state. It is
similar in many respects to the framework proposed by Talia Fisher, ‘A Nuanced Approach to the Pri-
vatization Debate’ (2011) 5(1) Law and Ethics of Human Rights 72; and discussed in Muir Watt (n 2) 418.
188 R Quadri, Lezioni di diritto internazionale privato (Liguori, 3rd edn 1961).
189 Boden (n 170).
190 Hannah L Buxbaum, ‘Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance’ (2002) 42(4) Virginia
Journal of International Law 931.
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internalizes alien constitutional norms into its own law, but at the same time
leaves their autonomy undisturbed.191
The idea here is that different methods are available to deal with issues of con-
flict according to the type of ‘social couplings’ involved for different types of
societal spheres. It may well be possible here to detect a similarity to the dif-
ferentiated modes of treatment in traditional conflicts doctrine according to
the type of legal area involved (persons, contracts, etc.). Thus, in societal con-
stitutionalism, different regimes (or nodes) each entertain particular relation-
ships with the social. The parameter is the constitution of the nation-state,
which is embedded within an encompassing legal order. In this respect, it dis-
poses of an ‘internal balance’ constituted by mechanisms of self-limitation,
notably a set of fundamental rights. By contrast, specialised transnational
regimes may present a far lesser degree of social embeddedness, lacking
similar internal resources. These are
tailored solely to a functionally differentiated sector of world society and as a
consequence represent a ‘self-contained regime’ that develops specialized
norms reflecting the independent rationality of the societal sector coupled to
them. Regime constitutions are partial constitutions that are not based on
overall social processes, i.e. those directed at the broader public interest.
At the other extreme, ‘indigenous’ normative orders are more strongly
embedded at the overall social level than nation-state law. The reason is
that ‘they appear in social areas in which no functionally differentiated legal
system has been formed: their norms are inseparably interwoven with reli-
gious, political, and economic aspects’.192
These differing degrees of social embeddedness, Teubner suggests, impact
directly upon the appropriate mode of conflict resolution. In instances invol-
ving only transnational specialised regimes (such as a conflict between party
autonomy and the requirements of health, culture, finance or the environ-
ment), the appropriate methodology would be the ‘substantive law approach’,
which ‘takes up elements from the conflicting constitutional norms in each
case and reflects these in the shape of a new substantive norm oriented at
the same time towards the ‘ordre public transnational’’. This leads to a
form of hybrid law as, from the viewpoint of the deciding authority, the sub-
stantive norm internalizes alien constitutional norms into its own law, but at
the same time leaves their autonomy undisturbed.
On the other hand, more socially embedded regimes appear as generating
‘intercultural conflicts’. An example, developed elsewhere, would be claims
grounded on indigenous property rights against the land-grab by private
investors in the context of investment arbitration. In many cases, the issue
191 Teubner (n 1) 169.
192 Ibid 172.
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will be brought before the courts and framed as involving a fundamental right
(for instance, the right to land as property, but also as environment and fur-
thermore as a sacred resource, which enters into collision with freedom of
contract).
Interestingly, some years ago, Von Mehren and Trautman had suggested a
similar methodology for the needs of interstate conflict of laws, according to
which each legal order reinvents the foreign norm in the light of a synthesis of
different values.193 This comes very close to saying that outcome of the con-
frontation between two different rules is the judicial creation of a third, which
(tailored to the case in the light of the various policies and interests involved)
takes on board elements from both. A similar move may sound much more
familiar if it is compared with proportionality as a mode of legal reasoning:
in the balancing process involving an individual human right and a restrictive
regulation, neither trumps the other automatically, but a step-by-step nego-
tiation of antagonistic aims and values may result in a hybrid norm.194 But
is there any limit, consistent with the premises of pluralism, to this reflexive
open-endedness to be brought into the conflict of laws?
B. Tolerance and the inversion of sovereignty
Conceptualising modes of interaction is not enough to respond to the conun-
drum that has plagued legal pluralism constantly, within or without the state.
Is there a limit to the tolerance of alterity, when the values of the receiving
system are perceived to be threatened? Must a liberal Western culture turn
a blind eye to practices that it perceives as antagonistic to its political morality,
such as hate-speech, or excision?195 This is the point at which theories of legal
pluralism usually fall short of providing an answer. Deferent to the other,
respectful of alterity, they also appear as apologetic, devoid of politics,
making no demands on the world.196 A recent debate on the place of religious
justice (sharia courts) in a secular state illustrates the apparent dilemma.
193 Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems (Little, Brown, 1965) under
the label of ‘functional analysis’.
194 An excellent example is provided by the decision of the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum
Chamber: R (on the application of ZAT and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
(Article 8 ECHR – Dublin Regulation – interface – proportionality) IJR, [2016] UKUT 00061 (IAC),
United Kingdom: Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (22 January 2016), which
solved the conflict between the ‘Dublin III’ Regulation and Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights in the case of unaccompanied child asylum seekers in Calais by reframing it as a
case of converging objectives within a proportionality analysis. On similar instruments of accommo-
dation such as margins of appreciation and subsidiarity regimes as pluralist legal tools and discursive
practices for managing hybridity, see Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2007) 80 Southern
California Law Review 1155, 1196 onward.
195 Pierre Legrand, ‘Sur l’analyse différentielle des juriscultures’ (1999) 4 Revue internationale de droit
comparé 1053. A comparative analysis of cultural practice, say of female genital mutilation, can
tend towards an understanding within that culture. Private international law is concerned with the
place that practice can have within the culture of the receiving or forum state.
196 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 35.
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Pluralists see no reason to prohibit the peaceful exercise of religious jurisdic-
tion within a predominantly secular community. Of course, this politically
liberal position is critiqued for the excess of tolerance across the political spec-
trum, ‘from rights advocates worried about illiberal practices to nation-state
sovereigntists worried about giving any authority at all to non-state commu-
nityties’.197 But the familiar internal – as it were, methodological – critique is
formulated in the other direction, by Pattersen and Galán, who argue that
pluralism is not really pluralism unless ‘liberal communities allow sharia
courts to operate regardless of whether or not they violate fundamental
values of the liberal community’.198
However recurrent, the objection is not insuperable, however (whether
addressed to legal pluralism or to liberal theories of justice more generally).
An answer can be found, for instance, in terms of the Rawlsian doctrine of
overlapping consensus, now also used to conceptualise heterarchical relation-
ships between overlapping legal orders in the international arena.199 In turn,
global legal pluralism advocates acceptance (here, in the case of sharia courts),
‘so long as those courts do not entrench upon fundamental values of the
liberal community’.200 This is where the conflict of laws provides additional
insights. It is the point on which the conflict of laws diverges from legal com-
paratism; specifically, whereas both are geared to understanding otherness,
the problem of private international law is ultimately to fit difference into
the legal universe of the forum. Here, too, the methodological contest
within the conflict of laws becomes highly significant.201 While multilateral-
ism is assimilationist in that reduces the acceptance of alterity to models it can
immediately comprehend, unilateralism, built on mutual accommodation,
responds to this challenge by pushing back the limits of acceptance of differ-
ence until it threatens the substantive values of the forum. The limit is defined
by substance, not form. In continental theory, the variable intensity of the
exception of public policy, according to whether a situation has been
created abroad or within the forum, is part of the unilateralist scheme.202
197 Berman (n 24) forthcoming.
198 Galán and Patterson (n 28); Berman (n 155).
199 Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, ‘Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy’ (1997) 3(4) European Law Journal
313.
200 Berman (n 24) forthcoming: ‘so long as’ evokes the Solange doctrine of the German Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, or BVG): See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorrats-
stelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, BVerfGE 37, 271 2 BvL 52/71 (29 May 1974) [Solange I]; Re Wünsche
Handelsgesellschaft BVerfGE (1984) Case 345/82, [1987] 3 CMLR 225 [Solange II].
201 As emphasised above, various perceptions of ‘conflict’ as including competition, or the aspiration
towards international coordination, alongside outright sovereign antagonism, have been bound up
historically with diverse methodologies and different conceptions of what it is (abstract rule, individua-
lised right, legal system as a whole, policy) that is actually involved in the interaction. The allocatory
function is exercised on the basis of private or public law values, domestic policy considerations or
deliberately cosmopolitan vision.
202 Boden (n 170).
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According to this doctrine, which has taken on a more contemporary form in
the ‘principle of proximity’, situations which would normally be intolerable if
they were to be created with the direct implication of the forum through close
connection to local society, can nevertheless be recognised ex post.203 This
device therefore serves to push back the point at which the forum will
refuse to recognise a foreign institution. This is why the pluralist response
makes sense:
Just because one embraces insights from legal pluralism, after all, does not
mean that the values of pluralism must necessarily and always trump any
other values a community might hold. It simply cannot be that legal pluralism
is only a true normative position if it is pursued to
the exclusion of all other values, interests, and commitments.204
That such a limit must be set in respect of transnational regime conflicts
beyond the state is also a conclusion reached in a different way by Teubner’s
societal constitutionalism. The problem is set in structural terms, as the need
for ‘countervailing tendencies’ in respect of the ‘compulsive growth compul-
sion’ of autonomous regimes.205 The disquieting conclusion which comes of
the observation of specialised systems such as finance in the global arena is
that ‘the self-reproduction of function systems and formal organizations
follow an inexorable growth imperative’.206 This idea can equally be
expressed, in Polyani’s terms, as a consequence of the ‘disembedding’ of
such regimes from their social roots.207 In terms equally familiar to the con-
flict of laws, they generate externalities within their environment, thereby
threatening the global commons.208 The explanation is to be found in the
specific structure of these specialised systems, which are ‘oriented towards
one and only one binary code’.209 As such, and differently from the social
systems of nation-states, they destroy ‘the inherent self-limitations which
worked effectively in the multifunctional institutions in traditional societies’.
This, then, is the particular problem of globalisation: ‘when the function
systems become global, thus freeing themselves from the dominance of
nation-state politics, there is no longer an agency to set them limits, stem
their centrifugal tendencies, or regulate their conflicts’.210 Whatever method-
ology is used to decide the conflicts which arise from such externalities, it
203 The contemporary version, proximity, introduces a distance element (linked to the liberalisation of jur-
isdictional criteria).
204 Berman (n 24) forthcoming.
205 Teubner (n 1) 71.
206 Ibid, 79.
207 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press,
2001), qualifying the idea of self-regulating market as a dangerous utopian myth. On Polyani’s
concept of ‘disembeddedness’ and its possible use for the conflict of laws, see Muir Watt (n 2).
208 On the possible use of conflict of laws as limiting negative externalities of legislation in respect of the
global commons, see Muir Watt (n 94).
209 Teubner (n 1) 79.
210 Ibid, 42.
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needs to set from the outside the very limits which such systems have eaten up
from the inside.211 Teubner proposes the concept of ‘sustainability’ with
which to capture the idea. Originally, this principle was designed to restrict
economic expansion at the expense of the natural environment with a view
to the protection of future generations. It is proposed here, however, that it
should not be limited to the relationship of the economy to nature, nor to
the relationship of a social system to just one of its environments.
Sustainability must be reconsidered in application to all function regimes; it
must at the same time include not just the natural environment, but all relevant
environments. Environment is to be understood here in the broadest sense, as
the natural, social, and human environment of transnational regimes.212
Dealing with externalities through widespread adhesion to the idea of sustain-
ability is certainly both coherent and desirable as a system of coexistence of
overlapping social systems, in the same way as it makes sense in dealing
with other tragedies of the global commons such as climate change. But
however reasonable it may seem, this pluralist stance still leaves open a fun-
damental question, which falls traditionally within the remit of political and
legal philosophy. It is basically the same issue of sovereignty that has
always been the core dilemma of private international law. How can adhesion
to what is basically a duty to cooperate (for instance, in protecting the global
commons) be conciliated with sovereignty (be it that of a nation-state or an
autonomous network node)? Global legal pluralism responds that a delibera-
tive approach is constitutionally necessary. An approach which might seek to
achieve a form of overlapping consensus between different axiological out-
looks, can be said in this respect to be a feature of a ‘new constitutionalism’,
indeed the only possible content of global constitutionalism. As Berman
notes,
[Scholars of constitutional pluralism] seek structures to guide constitutive sys-
temic interactions beyond the nation-state, and pluralism can offer a helpful
rubric for building such structures. Significantly, as Walker’s work makes
clear, legal pluralism provides a way to reinvigorate constitutional discourse
by reorienting it away from the structure of a single state and towards a discus-
sion of how to manage constitutive interactions among multiple normative
systems.213
In this respect, Nicole Roughan argues that what pluralists need to develop in
order to combat monist conceptions of the law (notably with Raz in mind) is
an ‘account of law that explains how different supremacy claims can be
211 Ibid, 166: ‘If the goal is to limit the expansion of modern-day institutions, there is no way around recon-
structing extrinsic factors using intrinsic concepts, in order to erect internal barriers in the appropriate
positions.’
212 Ibid, 173.
213 Berman (n 24) forthcoming.
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integrated and mutually recognized while upholding the authority of law’.214
Her idea of ‘relative authority’ aims to provide such an account: relative auth-
orities that must ‘cooperate, coordinate, or tolerate one another if they are to
have legitimacy [emphasis mine]’.215 In this model, the claim to legitimate
authority actually occurs through interdependence and interaction. Mireille
Delmas-Mary develops a similar idea, the passage from ‘solitary sovereignty’
to ‘solidary-sovereignty’ (de la souveraineté solitaire à la souveraineté soli-
daire).216 Both these positions evoke the conclusions reached within inter-
national relations theory on ‘sovereignty as symbolic form’. This takes us
back to the question of perspective. Indeed, Jens Bartelson shows how the
concept of sovereignty has become inverted in international politics.217
Initially designed to protect the political community of the nation-state
from outside intervention, it is now used to justify external interference.
Full sovereignty is the attribute of good states (benchmarked as such) that
have conformed to the requirements of international law. Sovereignty, in
other words, has come to do work that is the very reverse of its initial function.
The concept has been turned inside out. The perspective is reversed.
V. Conclusion: conflicting rationalities in practice
Bartelson’s analysis, which perfectly captures the theoretical move by which
contemporary pluralist legal theory establishes the conflict of laws as its
new axis, is conducted in the sophisticated terms of aesthetics.218 However,
as is often the case, practice has not waited for theory to catch up before
making an equally adventurous move. It has already had to confront conflict-
ing claims, values, interests, ideals and norms which appear beyond the remit
of state law in varied spheres and with diverse stakes and complex dynamics.
It is naturally less free than legal theory to break out of conventional vocabul-
aries in order to react appropriately.219 Nevertheless, many examples comes to
mind in which various established jurisdictions have adopted various forms of
lateral or reflexive thinking, produced hybrids in the course of accommodat-
ing colliding sets of rules or have sought to acknowledge the compliance pull
of informal practices. Among these, in addition to the instance involving pro-
portionality cited above,220 one might cite the case of Jivraj, in which a
214 Nicole Roughan, ‘From Authority to Authorities: Bridging the Social/Normative Divide’ in Cotterrell and
Del Mar (n 13).
215 Ibid.
216 Mireille Delmas-Marty, Résister, responsabiliser, anticiper (Seuil, 2013).
217 Bartelson (n 14).
218 For a return of aesthetics, too, in comparative legal theory, see Monateri (n 18).
219 On the constraints of conventional argument bites, see Duncan Kennedy, ‘A Semiotics of Legal Argu-
ment’ III(2) Academy of European Law 309; and for an attempt to apply this to the conflict of laws,
Horatia Muir Watt, ‘A Semiotics of Private International Legal Reasoning’ in Bonomi and Romano (n
155) 51–70.
220 Mehren and Trautman (n 193).
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religious arbitration clause was contested as discriminatory under EU
employment legislation;221 or James Elliott Construction,222 in which the
ECJ is called upon for the first time to interpret technical standards;223 or
again, the recent Claudia Pechstein case, in which compulsory arbitration
in sports disputes is pitted against competition law in the German courts.224
However, the last word will be for a particularly remarkable example,
which acknowledges the conflicts between expanding autonomous regimes,
and proposes an equally pluralist response. It can be found in a recent
child slavery case in US federal court, involving cocoa farms in the Ivory
Coast. Appropriately illustrative of a problem that is emblematically global,
it concerns the functioning of worldwide value chains and commodities
markets, which are arguably the most potent recipes for destructive external-
ities in the global social and ecological environment today.225 It serves first to
suggest the importance and relevance of pluralist understandings of the
complex normative landscape beyond the state in which regulatory power
(here, over the world cocoa market) is asserted by a multinational market
actor. At the same time, the analysis is carried out within a conflict of laws
framework, which structures the court’s jurisdictional enquiry under the
Alien Tort Statute. However, remarkably, neither territory, sovereignty, nor
the requirements of foreign policy are part of the legal reasoning used by
the court, although they have been the focus of (private international) law’s
more familiar approach to the governance of corporate conduct abroad. On
the other hand, what the Court is clearly attempting to do within the
formal confines of a determination of jurisdiction is to bring the pressure
of the legal system on a point (in various vocabularies, a ‘hub’, weakest link
or ‘pressure point’, or a point of ‘jurisdictional touchdown’) in a global pro-
duction chain.226
The court (US Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit) refers to the economic
leverage exercised by a particular brand in the world commodity market, from
221 Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, allowing an appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal ([2010]
EWCA Civ 712), according to which an arbitration clause stipulating that the arbitrators should be pro-
minent members of the Ismaili community, was void under regulations giving effect to anti-discrimi-
nation provisions of EU employment legislation.
222 The original case is James Elliott Construction Ltd v Irish Asphalt [2014] 1 ESC 74 (Supreme Court of
Ireland); on the request for preliminary ruling, see Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona, C-
613/14 (28 January 2016).
223 On this type of conflict involving private regulatory standards, see Harm Schepel, ‘Rules of Recognition:
A Legal Constructivist Approach to Transnational Private Regulation’ in Paulius Jurcys, Poul F Kjaer and
Ren Yatsunami (eds), Regulatory Hybridization in the Transnational Sphere (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 189–
202.
224 Antoine Duval, The Pechstein Case: Transnational Constitutionalism in Action at the Bundesgerichtshof
(10 March 2016), VerfassungsBlog online: <http://verfassungsblog.de/the-pechstein-case-
transnational-constitutionalism-in-action-at-the-bundesgerichtshof>.
225 On the implications of global value chains for hunger, see Olivier De Schutter and Kaitlin Y Cordes,
Accounting for Hunger: The Right to Food in the Era of Globalisation (Hart Publishing, 2011).
226 On the hub analysis, Tomaso Ferrando, ‘Land and Territory in Global Production: A Critical Legal Chain
Analysis’ (PhD Law thesis, Sciences Po 2015.
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which it then draws legal inferences. In DOE V NESTLE USA, INC,227 the
Court asserts:
[T]he defendants had enough control over the Ivorian cocoa market that they
could have stopped or limited the use of child slave labor by their suppliers. The
defendants did not use their control to stop the use of child slavery, however,
but instead offered support that facilitated it. Viewed alongside the allegation
that the defendants benefitted from the use of child slavery, the defendants’
failure to stop or limit child slavery supports the inference that they intended
to keep that system in place… the defendants participated in lobbying efforts
designed to defeat federal legislation that would have required chocolate impor-
ters and manufacturers to certify and label their chocolate as ‘slave free’. As an
alternative to the proposed legislation, the defendants, along with others from
the chocolate industry, supported a voluntary mechanism through which the
chocolate industry would police itself.
This passage draws attention, in a pluralist mode, to other normative phenom-
ena involving private power, self-regulation, reputational pressure and certifica-
tion of compliance to moral standards. The leverage of private actors within the
market through their brands is acknowledged, as is their power of regulatory
capture through lobbying and the triumph of self-regulation. The legal response
can be understood in terms of social responsibility, ‘juridical touchdown’228 (in
Robert Wai’s vocabulary), victim access to justice (rather than territorial juris-
diction, contract, corporate form, market) and a political horizon in which the
pursuit of profit or market efficiency is balanced against other values.
The evolving landscape of judicial practice shows that the time is ripe –
indeed, it may be a question of survival of the discipline – for the conflict of
laws to absorb these pluralist understandings which it can enhance, in turn,
with the body of knowledge that first emerged in a pre-modern context of
plural authorities, unchartered territories and indeterminate boundaries
between the public and the private spheres. Indeed, enriched conflict of laws
theory has the potential to serve at the problematic heart of global law and its
relationship to global justice, by contributing principles with which to govern
non-state authority; infuse hybrid normative interactions with ideas of tolerance
and mutual accommodation; and ensure accountability in the global decision-
making processes through deliberation,229 contestation,230 and recognition.231
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